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Friday, April 30, 2010

The Concept of Sudden Death By Ippon




A quote from "A History of the Kodokan - Part 6"

Although Kano sought to preserve, in a sense, the old codes of honor of the warriors of Medieval Japan, he also felt compelled to abandon those aspects which he viewed as anachronistic. The concept, for instance, of "sudden death," the old Samurai ideal of death by one skillful cut of the perfection of the sword, did not survive in the sport context of Judo. Kano saw this as defeating the purpose of sport, of risk to obtain advantage, of development of strategy and skill. Instead, he favored Judo competitions, Shiai, rather than the old-style, sudden death, contests, or Shobu.

"Sudden death" inhibited risk taking; but if no risks were taken, sound judgment regarding risk was not developed. Sport, as a theory, was the natural experience of developing quick judgment in the taking of risks, under a set of rules, to obtain a goal. Nothing in life was much different. Kano understood this. Judo rules, under Kano, were three point contests, not sudden death or "ippon".

Japanese militarism, during the 1930's, however, attempted to revive for nationalistic purposes, the Samurai ideal of complete sacrifice of the individual, in one glorious moment, for the good of the nation. The military imposed upon the Kodokan the rule of one point wins.(7) As Kano feared, such a perspective created Shobu, rather than Shiai. "Sudden death" rules punished, and still punish, experimentation, creativity, and use of competition as a means of forging techniques. However, Judo has evolved Randori into a stronger practice than was reflected by Kano's wishes. So perhaps the sport element of practice and risk-taking has merely mutated into a different part of Judo practice.

Shobu has created a caution in Judo matches which degrades their educational purpose. On the other hand, of all sports, Judo does truly reflect the old Samurai ethic that one mistake meant death; that success was a commitment to total victory. In this aspect, it remains unique among the competitive martial arts, which otherwise universally follow a point scoring system, and among non-competitive martial arts, which do not experience the sense of sudden death even though many purport to train with the so-called deadly techniques. It is the experience, not the knowledge, that leads to the Zen state, and so, again, Judo seems to invariably move toward an ideal that many other martial ways can only talk about.

Sun Tzu On the Art of War

SUN TZU ON THE ART OF WAR
THE OLDEST MILITARY TREATISE IN THE WORLD

Translated from the Chinese
By LIONEL GILES, M.A. (1910)



I. LAYING PLANS


1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance
to the State.

2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either
to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry
which can on no account be neglected.

3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant
factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations,
when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.

4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth;
(4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline.

5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete
accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him
regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.

7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat,
times and seasons.

8. Earth comprises distances, great and small;
danger and security; open ground and narrow passes;
the chances of life and death.

9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom,
sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness.

10. By method and discipline are to be understood
the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions,
the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance
of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the
control of military expenditure.

11. These five heads should be familiar to every general:
he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them
not will fail.

12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking
to determine the military conditions, let them be made
the basis of a comparison, in this wise:--

13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued
with the Moral law?
(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?
(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven
and Earth?
(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?
(5) Which army is stronger?
(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?
(7) In which army is there the greater constancy
both in reward and punishment?

14. By means of these seven considerations I can
forecast victory or defeat.

15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts
upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command!
The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it,
will suffer defeat:--let such a one be dismissed!

16. While heading the profit of my counsel,
avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances
over and beyond the ordinary rules.

17. According as circumstances are favorable,
one should modify one's plans.

18. All warfare is based on deception.

19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable;
when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we
are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away;
when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder,
and crush him.

21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him.
If he is in superior strength, evade him.

22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to
irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.
If his forces are united, separate them.

24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where
you are not expected.

25. These military devices, leading to victory,
must not be divulged beforehand.

26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many
calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.
The general who loses a battle makes but few
calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations
lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat:
how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention
to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.




II. WAGING WAR


1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war,
where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots,
as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand
mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them
a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front,
including entertainment of guests, small items such as
glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor,
will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day.
Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory
is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and
their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town,
you will exhaust your strength.
3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources
of the State will not be equal to the strain.

4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped,
your strength exhausted and your treasure spent,
other chieftains will spring up to take advantage
of your extremity. Then no man, however wise,
will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,
cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited
from prolonged warfare.

7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted
with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand
the profitable way of carrying it on.

8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy,
neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.

9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage
on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough
for its needs.

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army
to be maintained by contributions from a distance.
Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes
the people to be impoverished.

11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes
prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's
substance to be drained away.

12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry
will be afflicted by heavy exactions.

13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion
of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare,
and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated;
while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses,
breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields,
protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons,
will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging
on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions
is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise
a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty
from one's own store.

16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must
be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from
defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots
have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first.
Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy,
and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours.
The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment
one's own strength.

19. In war, then, let your great object be victory,
not lengthy campaigns.

20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies
is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it
depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.




III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM


1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best
thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact;
to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is
better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it,
to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire
than to destroy them.

2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles
is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists
in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.

3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to
balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent
the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in
order is to attack the enemy's army in the field;
and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it
can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets,
movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take
up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over
against the walls will take three months more.

5. The general, unable to control his irritation,
will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,
with the result that one-third of his men are slain,
while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous
effects of a siege.

6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's
troops without any fighting; he captures their cities
without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom
without lengthy operations in the field.

7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery
of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph
will be complete. This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten
to the enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one,
to attack him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army
into two.

9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;
if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;
if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.

10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made
by a small force, in the end it must be captured
by the larger force.

11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State;
if the bulwark is complete at all points; the State will
be strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will
be weak.

12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring
misfortune upon his army:--

13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat,
being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey.
This is called hobbling the army.

14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the
same way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant
of the conditions which obtain in an army. This causes
restlessness in the soldier's minds.

15. (3) By employing the officers of his army
without discrimination, through ignorance of the
military principle of adaptation to circumstances.
This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.

16. But when the army is restless and distrustful,
trouble is sure to come from the other feudal princes.
This is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging
victory away.

17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials
for victory:
(1) He will win who knows when to fight and when
not to fight.
(2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior
and inferior forces.
(3) He will win whose army is animated by the same
spirit throughout all its ranks.
(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take
the enemy unprepared.
(5) He will win who has military capacity and is
not interfered with by the sovereign.

18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy
and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a
hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy,
for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.
If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will
succumb in every battle.




IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS


1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put
themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then
waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.

2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our
own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy
is provided by the enemy himself.
3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat,
but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.

4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer
without being able to do it.

5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics;
ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.

6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient
strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.

7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the
most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in
attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven.
Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves;
on the other, a victory that is complete.

8. To see victory only when it is within the ken
of the common herd is not the acme of excellence.

9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight
and conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"

10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;
to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight;
to hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.

11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is
one who not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.

12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation
for wisdom nor credit for courage.

13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.
Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty
of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is
already defeated.

14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into
a position which makes defeat impossible, and does
not miss the moment for defeating the enemy.

15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist
only seeks battle after the victory has been won,
whereas he who is destined to defeat first fights
and afterwards looks for victory.

16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law,
and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is
in his power to control success.

17. In respect of military method, we have,
firstly, Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity;
thirdly, Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances;
fifthly, Victory.

18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth;
Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to
Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to Calculation;
and Victory to Balancing of chances.

19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as
a pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.

20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting
of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.






V. ENERGY


1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force
is the same principle as the control of a few men:
it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers.

2. Fighting with a large army under your command
is nowise different from fighting with a small one:
it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals.

3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand
the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken--
this is effected by maneuvers direct and indirect.

4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone
dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science
of weak points and strong.

5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used
for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed
in order to secure victory.

6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible
as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams;
like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew;
like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more.

7. There are not more than five musical notes,
yet the combinations of these five give rise to more
melodies than can ever be heard.

8. There are not more than five primary colors
(blue, yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination
they produce more hues than can ever been seen.

9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes
(sour, acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations
of them yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.

10. In battle, there are not more than two methods
of attack--the direct and the indirect; yet these two
in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.

11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn.
It is like moving in a circle--you never come to an end.
Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?

12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent
which will even roll stones along in its course.

13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed
swoop of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy
its victim.

14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible
in his onset, and prompt in his decision.

15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow;
decision, to the releasing of a trigger.

16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may
be seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all;
amid confusion and chaos, your array may be without head
or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.

17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline,
simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness
postulates strength.

18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is
simply a question of subdivision; concealing courage under
a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent energy;
masking strength with weakness is to be effected
by tactical dispositions.

19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy
on the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to
which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something,
that the enemy may snatch at it.

20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march;
then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.

21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined
energy, and does not require too much from individuals.
Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize
combined energy.

22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting
men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones.
For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain
motionless on level ground, and to move when on a slope;
if four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if
round-shaped, to go rolling down.

23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men
is as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain
thousands of feet in height. So much on the subject
of energy.




VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG


1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and
awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight;
whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle
will arrive exhausted.

2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on
the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.

3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy
to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage,
he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.

4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;
if well supplied with food, he can starve him out;
if quietly encamped, he can force him to move.

5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend;
march swiftly to places where you are not expected.

6. An army may march great distances without distress,
if it marches through country where the enemy is not.

7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks
if you only attack places which are undefended.You can
ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold
positions that cannot be attacked.

8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose
opponent does not know what to defend; and he is skillful
in defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.

9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you
we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;
and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.

10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible,
if you make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire
and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more rapid
than those of the enemy.

11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced
to an engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high
rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack
some other place that he will be obliged to relieve.

12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent
the enemy from engaging us even though the lines
of our encampment be merely traced out on the ground.
All we need do is to throw something odd and unaccountable
in his way.

13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining
invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated,
while the enemy's must be divided.

14. We can form a single united body, while the
enemy must split up into fractions. Hence there will
be a whole pitted against separate parts of a whole,
which means that we shall be many to the enemy's few.

15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force
with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.

16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be
made known; for then the enemy will have to prepare
against a possible attack at several different points;
and his forces being thus distributed in many directions,
the numbers we shall have to face at any given point will
be proportionately few.

17. For should the enemy strengthen his van,
he will weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear,
he will weaken his van; should he strengthen his left,
he will weaken his right; should he strengthen his right,
he will weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere,
he will everywhere be weak.

18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare
against possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling
our adversary to make these preparations against us.

19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle,
we may concentrate from the greatest distances in order
to fight.

20. But if neither time nor place be known,
then the left wing will be impotent to succor the right,
the right equally impotent to succor the left, the van
unable to relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van.
How much more so if the furthest portions of the army are
anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest
are separated by several LI!

21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers
of Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage
them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then
that victory can be achieved.

22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may
prevent him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover
his plans and the likelihood of their success.

23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his
activity or inactivity. Force him to reveal himself,
so as to find out his vulnerable spots.

24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own,
so that you may know where strength is superabundant
and where it is deficient.

25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch
you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions,
and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest spies,
from the machinations of the wisest brains.

26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's
own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.

27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer,
but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory
is evolved.

28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained
you one victory, but let your methods be regulated
by the infinite variety of circumstances.

29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its
natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.

30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong
and to strike at what is weak.

31. Water shapes its course according to the nature
of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works
out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing.

32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape,
so in warfare there are no constant conditions.

33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his
opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called
a heaven-born captain.

34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth)
are not always equally predominant; the four seasons make
way for each other in turn. There are short days and long;
the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.




VII. MANEUVERING


1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his
commands from the sovereign.

2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces,
he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof
before pitching his camp.

3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering,
than which there is nothing more difficult.
The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists
in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.

4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route,
after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting
after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him,
shows knowledge of the artifice of DEVIATION.

5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous;
with an undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.

6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order
to snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be
too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column
for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage
and stores.

7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their
buff-coats, and make forced marches without halting day
or night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch,
doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage,
the leaders of all your three divisions will fall into
the hands of the enemy.

8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded
ones will fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth
of your army will reach its destination.

9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver
the enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division,
and only half your force will reach the goal.

10. If you march thirty LI with the same object,
two-thirds of your army will arrive.

11. We may take it then that an army without its
baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost;
without bases of supply it is lost.

12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are
acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.

13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march
unless we are familiar with the face of the country--its
mountains and forests, its pitfalls and precipices,
its marshes and swamps.

14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage
to account unless we make use of local guides.

15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.

16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops,
must be decided by circumstances.

17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind,
your compactness that of the forest.

18. In raiding and plundering be like fire,
is immovability like a mountain.

19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night,
and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.

20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be
divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory,
cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.

21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.

22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice
of deviation. Such is the art of maneuvering.

23. The Book of Army Management says: On the field
of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough:
hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary
objects be seen clearly enough: hence the institution
of banners and flags.

24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means
whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused
on one particular point.

25. The host thus forming a single united body,
is it impossible either for the brave to advance alone,
or for the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art
of handling large masses of men.

26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires
and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners,
as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.

27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;
a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.

28. Now a soldier's spirit is keenest in the morning;
by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening,
his mind is bent only on returning to camp.

29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when
its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish
and inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.

30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance
of disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art
of retaining self-possession.

31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still
far from it, to wait at ease while the enemy is
toiling and struggling, to be well-fed while the enemy
is famished:--this is the art of husbanding one's strength.

32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose
banners are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking
an army drawn up in calm and confident array:--this
is the art of studying circumstances.

33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill
against the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.

34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight;
do not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.

35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy.
Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.

36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.
Do not press a desperate foe too hard.

37. Such is the art of warfare.




VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS


1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives
his commands from the sovereign, collects his army
and concentrates his forces

2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country
where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies.
Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions.
In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem.
In desperate position, you must fight.

3. There are roads which must not be followed,
armies which must be not attacked, towns which must
be besieged, positions which must not be contested,
commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.

4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages
that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle
his troops.

5. The general who does not understand these, may be well
acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he
will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.

6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art
of war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted
with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use
of his men.

7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of
advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.

8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in
this way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential
part of our schemes.

9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties
we are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate
ourselves from misfortune.

10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage
on them; and make trouble for them, and keep them
constantly engaged; hold out specious allurements,
and make them rush to any given point.

11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the
likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness
to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking,
but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.

12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect
a general:
(1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;
(2) cowardice, which leads to capture;
(3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;
(4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;
(5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him
to worry and trouble.

13. These are the five besetting sins of a general,
ruinous to the conduct of war.

14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain,
the cause will surely be found among these five
dangerous faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.




IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH


1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of
encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy.
Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighborhood
of valleys.

2. Camp in high places, facing the sun. Do not climb
heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.

3. After crossing a river, you should get far away
from it.

4. When an invading force crosses a river in its
onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream.
It will be best to let half the army get across,
and then deliver your attack.

5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go
to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross.

6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing
the sun. Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.
So much for river warfare.

7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern
should be to get over them quickly, without any delay.

8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should
have water and grass near you, and get your back
to a clump of trees. So much for operations in salt-marches.

9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible
position with rising ground to your right and on your rear,
so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind.
So much for campaigning in flat country.

10. These are the four useful branches of military
knowledge which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish
four several sovereigns.

11. All armies prefer high ground to low and sunny
places to dark.

12. If you are careful of your men, and camp on hard
ground, the army will be free from disease of every kind,
and this will spell victory.

13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the
sunny side, with the slope on your right rear.
Thus you will at once act for the benefit of your soldiers
and utilize the natural advantages of the ground.

14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country,
a river which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked
with foam, you must wait until it subsides.

15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs
with torrents running between, deep natural hollows,
confined places, tangled thickets, quagmires and crevasses,
should be left with all possible speed and not approached.

16. While we keep away from such places, we should
get the enemy to approach them; while we face them,
we should let the enemy have them on his rear.

17. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should
be any hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass,
hollow basins filled with reeds, or woods with thick
undergrowth, they must be carefully routed out and searched;
for these are places where men in ambush or insidious
spies are likely to be lurking.

18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet,
he is relying on the natural strength of his position.

19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle,
he is anxious for the other side to advance.

20. If his place of encampment is easy of access,
he is tendering a bait.

21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the
enemy is advancing. The appearance of a number of screens
in the midst of thick grass means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.

22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign
of an ambuscade. Startled beasts indicate that a sudden
attack is coming.

23. When there is dust rising in a high column,
it is the sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low,
but spread over a wide area, it betokens the approach
of infantry. When it branches out in different directions,
it shows that parties have been sent to collect firewood.
A few clouds of dust moving to and fro signify that the army
is encamping.

24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs
that the enemy is about to advance. Violent language
and driving forward as if to the attack are signs that he
will retreat.

25. When the light chariots come out first and take
up a position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy
is forming for battle.

26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant
indicate a plot.

27. When there is much running about and the soldiers
fall into rank, it means that the critical moment has come.

28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating,
it is a lure.

29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears,
they are faint from want of food.

30. If those who are sent to draw water begin
by drinking themselves, the army is suffering from thirst.

31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and
makes no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.

32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied.
Clamor by night betokens nervousness.

33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's
authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted
about, sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry,
it means that the men are weary.

34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills
its cattle for food, and when the men do not hang their
cooking-pots over the camp-fires, showing that they
will not return to their tents, you may know that they
are determined to fight to the death.

35. The sight of men whispering together in small
knots or speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection
amongst the rank and file.

36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is
at the end of his resources; too many punishments betray
a condition of dire distress.

37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright
at the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.

38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths,
it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce.

39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain
facing ours for a long time without either joining
battle or taking themselves off again, the situation
is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.

40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy,
that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack
can be made. What we can do is simply to concentrate all
our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy,
and obtain reinforcements.

41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light
of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.

42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown
attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and,
unless submissive, then will be practically useless.
If, when the soldiers have become attached to you,
punishments are not enforced, they will still be unless.

43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first
instance with humanity, but kept under control by means
of iron discipline. This is a certain road to victory.

44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually
enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not,
its discipline will be bad.

45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always
insists on his orders being obeyed, the gain will be mutual.




X. TERRAIN


1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain,
to wit: (1) Accessible ground; (2) entangling ground;
(3) temporizing ground; (4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous
heights; (6) positions at a great distance from the enemy.

2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides
is called accessible.

3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before
the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots,
and carefully guard your line of supplies. Then you
will be able to fight with advantage.

4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard
to re-occupy is called entangling.

5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy
is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him.
But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you
fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible,
disaster will ensue.

6. When the position is such that neither side will gain
by making the first move, it is called temporizing ground.

7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy
should offer us an attractive bait, it will be advisable
not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, thus enticing
the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army has
come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.

8. With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy
them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await
the advent of the enemy.

9. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass,
do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned,
but only if it is weakly garrisoned.

10. With regard to precipitous heights, if you are
beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the
raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.

11. If the enemy has occupied them before you,
do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.

12. If you are situated at a great distance from
the enemy, and the strength of the two armies is equal,
it is not easy to provoke a battle, and fighting will be
to your disadvantage.

13. These six are the principles connected with Earth.
The general who has attained a responsible post must be
careful to study them.

14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities,
not arising from natural causes, but from faults
for which the general is responsible. These are:
(1) Flight; (2) insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin;
(5) disorganization; (6) rout.

15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is
hurled against another ten times its size, the result
will be the flight of the former.

16. When the common soldiers are too strong and
their officers too weak, the result is insubordination.
When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers
too weak, the result is collapse.

17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate,
and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account
from a feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief
can tell whether or no he is in a position to fight,
the result is ruin.

18. When the general is weak and without authority;
when his orders are not clear and distinct; when there
are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men,
and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner,
the result is utter disorganization.

19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's
strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one,
or hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one,
and neglects to place picked soldiers in the front rank,
the result must be rout.

20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must
be carefully noted by the general who has attained
a responsible post.

21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's
best ally; but a power of estimating the adversary,
of controlling the forces of victory, and of shrewdly
calculating difficulties, dangers and distances,
constitutes the test of a great general.

22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts
his knowledge into practice, will win his battles.
He who knows them not, nor practices them, will surely
be defeated.

23. If fighting is sure to result in victory,
then you must fight, even though the ruler forbid it;
if fighting will not result in victory, then you must not
fight even at the ruler's bidding.

24. The general who advances without coveting fame
and retreats without fearing disgrace, whose only
thought is to protect his country and do good service
for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.

25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they
will follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them
as your own beloved sons, and they will stand by you
even unto death.

26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make
your authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce
your commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder:
then your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children;
they are useless for any practical purpose.

27. If we know that our own men are in a condition
to attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open
to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.

28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack,
but are unaware that our own men are not in a condition
to attack, we have gone only halfway towards victory.

29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack,
and also know that our men are in a condition to attack,
but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes
fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway
towards victory.

30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion,
is never bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never
at a loss.

31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and
know yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt;
if you know Heaven and know Earth, you may make your
victory complete.





XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS


1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground:
(1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) contentious ground;
(4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting highways;
(6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in ground;
(9) desperate ground.

2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory,
it is dispersive ground.

3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory,
but to no great distance, it is facile ground.

4. Ground the possession of which imports great
advantage to either side, is contentious ground.

5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement
is open ground.

6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,
so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire
at his command, is a ground of intersecting highways.

7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a
hostile country, leaving a number of fortified cities
in its rear, it is serious ground.

8. Mountain forests, rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all
country that is hard to traverse: this is difficult ground.

9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges,
and from which we can only retire by tortuous paths,
so that a small number of the enemy would suffice to crush
a large body of our men: this is hemmed in ground.

10. Ground on which we can only be saved from
destruction by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.

11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not.
On facile ground, halt not. On contentious ground,
attack not.

12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way.
On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands
with your allies.

13. On serious ground, gather in plunder.
In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.

14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.
On desperate ground, fight.

15. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew
how to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear;
to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions;
to hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad,
the officers from rallying their men.

16. When the enemy's men were united, they managed
to keep them in disorder.

17. When it was to their advantage, they made
a forward move; when otherwise, they stopped still.

18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy
in orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack,
I should say: "Begin by seizing something which your
opponent holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."

19. Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of
the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes,
and attack unguarded spots.

20. The following are the principles to be observed
by an invading force: The further you penetrate into
a country, the greater will be the solidarity of your troops,
and thus the defenders will not prevail against you.

21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply
your army with food.

22. Carefully study the well-being of your men,
and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard
your strength. Keep your army continually on the move,
and devise unfathomable plans.

23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there
is no escape, and they will prefer death to flight.
If they will face death, there is nothing they may
not achieve. Officers and men alike will put forth
their uttermost strength.

24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose
the sense of fear. If there is no place of refuge,
they will stand firm. If they are in hostile country,
they will show a stubborn front. If there is no help
for it, they will fight hard.

25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers
will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to
be asked, they will do your will; without restrictions,
they will be faithful; without giving orders, they can
be trusted.

26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with
superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes,
no calamity need be feared.

27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money,
it is not because they have a distaste for riches;
if their lives are not unduly long, it is not because they
are disinclined to longevity.

28. On the day they are ordered out to battle,
your soldiers may weep, those sitting up bedewing
their garments, and those lying down letting the tears run
down their cheeks. But let them once be brought to bay,
and they will display the courage of a Chu or a Kuei.

29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the
shuai-jan. Now the shuai-jan is a snake that is found
in the ChUng mountains. Strike at its head, and you
will be attacked by its tail; strike at its tail, and you
will be attacked by its head; strike at its middle,
and you will be attacked by head and tail both.

30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the shuai-jan,
I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men
of Yueh are enemies; yet if they are crossing a river
in the same boat and are caught by a storm, they will come
to each other's assistance just as the left hand helps the right.

31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust
in the tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot
wheels in the ground

32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set
up one standard of courage which all must reach.

33. How to make the best of both strong and weak--that
is a question involving the proper use of ground.

34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just
as though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by
the hand.

35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus
ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.

36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men
by false reports and appearances, and thus keep them
in total ignorance.

37. By altering his arrangements and changing
his plans, he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.
By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes,
he prevents the enemy from anticipating his purpose.

38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army
acts like one who has climbed up a height and then kicks
away the ladder behind him. He carries his men deep
into hostile territory before he shows his hand.

39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots;
like a shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives
his men this way and that, and nothing knows whither he
is going.

40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:--this
may be termed the business of the general.

41. The different measures suited to the nine
varieties of ground; the expediency of aggressive or
defensive tactics; and the fundamental laws of human nature:
these are things that must most certainly be studied.

42. When invading hostile territory, the general
principle is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion;
penetrating but a short way means dispersion.

43. When you leave your own country behind, and take
your army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself
on critical ground. When there are means of communication
on all four sides, the ground is one of intersecting highways.

44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is
serious ground. When you penetrate but a little way,
it is facile ground.

45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear,
and narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground.
When there is no place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.

46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire
my men with unity of purpose. On facile ground, I would
see that there is close connection between all parts
of my army.

47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.

48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye
on my defenses. On ground of intersecting highways,
I would consolidate my alliances.

49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure
a continuous stream of supplies. On difficult ground,
I would keep pushing on along the road.

50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way
of retreat. On desperate ground, I would proclaim
to my soldiers the hopelessness of saving their lives.

51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer
an obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard
when he cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he
has fallen into danger.

52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring
princes until we are acquainted with their designs. We are
not fit to lead an army on the march unless we are familiar
with the face of the country--its mountains and forests,
its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.
We shall be unable to turn natural advantages to account
unless we make use of local guides.

53. To be ignored of any one of the following four
or five principles does not befit a warlike prince.

54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state,
his generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration
of the enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents,
and their allies are prevented from joining against him.

55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all
and sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states.
He carries out his own secret designs, keeping his
antagonists in awe. Thus he is able to capture their
cities and overthrow their kingdoms.

56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule,
issue orders without regard to previous arrangements;
and you will be able to handle a whole army as though
you had to do with but a single man.

57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself;
never let them know your design. When the outlook is bright,
bring it before their eyes; but tell them nothing when
the situation is gloomy.

58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive;
plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off
in safety.

59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into
harm's way that is capable of striking a blow for victory.

60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully
accommodating ourselves to the enemy's purpose.

61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank, we shall
succeed in the long run in killing the commander-in-chief.

62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing
by sheer cunning.

63. On the day that you take up your command,
block the frontier passes, destroy the official tallies,
and stop the passage of all emissaries.

64. Be stern in the council-chamber, so that you
may control the situation.

65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.

66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,
and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.

67. Walk in the path defined by rule, and accommodate
yourself to the enemy until you can fight a decisive battle.

68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden,
until the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate
the rapidity of a running hare, and it will be too late
for the enemy to oppose you.




XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE


1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking
with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp;
the second is to burn stores; the third is to burn
baggage trains; the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines;
the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.

2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have
means available. The material for raising fire should
always be kept in readiness.

3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire,
and special days for starting a conflagration.

4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry;
the special days are those when the moon is in the
constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing
or the Cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind.

5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared
to meet five possible developments:

6. (1) When fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp,
respond at once with an attack from without.

7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's
soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.

8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height,
follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable;
if not, stay where you are.

9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire
from without, do not wait for it to break out within,
but deliver your attack at a favorable moment.

10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it.
Do not attack from the leeward.

11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long,
but a night breeze soon falls.

12. In every army, the five developments connected with
fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated,
and a watch kept for the proper days.

13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show intelligence;
those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an accession of strength.

14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted,
but not robbed of all his belongings.

15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his
battles and succeed in his attacks without cultivating
the spirit of enterprise; for the result is waste of time
and general stagnation.

16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his
plans well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources.

17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not
your troops unless there is something to be gained;
fight not unless the position is critical.

18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely
to gratify his own spleen; no general should fight
a battle simply out of pique.

19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move;
if not, stay where you are.

20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may
be succeeded by content.

21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can
never come again into being; nor can the dead ever
be brought back to life.

22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful,
and the good general full of caution. This is the way
to keep a country at peace and an army intact.




XIII. THE USE OF SPIES


1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand
men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss
on the people and a drain on the resources of the State.
The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces
of silver. There will be commotion at home and abroad,
and men will drop down exhausted on the highways.
As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded
in their labor.

2. Hostile armies may face each other for years,
striving for the victory which is decided in a single day.
This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's
condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred
ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is the height
of inhumanity.

3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present
help to his sovereign, no master of victory.

4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good
general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond
the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge.

5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits;
it cannot be obtained inductively from experience,
nor by any deductive calculation.

6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only
be obtained from other men.

7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes:
(1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies;
(4) doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.

8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work,
none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine
manipulation of the threads." It is the sovereign's
most precious faculty.

9. Having local spies means employing the services
of the inhabitants of a district.

10. Having inward spies, making use of officials
of the enemy.

11. Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy's
spies and using them for our own purposes.

12. Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly
for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know
of them and report them to the enemy.

13. Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring
back news from the enemy's camp.

14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are
more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies.
None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other
business should greater secrecy be preserved.

15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain
intuitive sagacity.

16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence
and straightforwardness.

17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make
certain of the truth of their reports.

18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every
kind of business.

19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy
before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together
with the man to whom the secret was told.

20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm
a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always
necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants,
the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general
in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.

21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us
must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and
comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted
spies and available for our service.

22. It is through the information brought by the
converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ
local and inward spies.

23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can
cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.

24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving
spy can be used on appointed occasions.

25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties
is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only
be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy.
Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated
with the utmost liberality.

26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty was due to I
Chih who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise
of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya who had served
under the Yin.

27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the
wise general who will use the highest intelligence of
the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve
great results. Spies are a most important element in water,
because on them depends an army's ability to move.

Thirty-Six Stratagems


Unless otherwise specified, Chinese texts in this article are written in "Traditional Chinese/Simplified Chinese, pinyin" format. In cases where traditional and simplified Chinese characters are identical, the Chinese term is written once.


The Thirty-Six Stratagems (三十六計/三十六计, Sānshíliù Jì) was a Chinese essay used to illustrate a series of stratagems used in politics, war, as well as in civil interaction, often through unorthodox or deceptive means.

The Stratagems are often misnamed as strategies; however, stratagem (synonymous with ruse) has nothing to do with strategy (being a long-term plan or outline).


Origin

The name of the collection comes from the Book of Qi, in its seventh biographical volume, Biography of Wáng Jìngzé (王敬則傳/王敬则传).[1] Wáng was a general who had served Southern Qi since the first Emperor Gao of the dynasty. When Emperor Ming came to power and executed many members of the court and royal family for fear that they would threaten his reign, Wáng believed that he would be targeted next and rebelled. As Wáng received news that Xiao Baojuan, son and crown prince of Emperor Ming, had escaped in haste after learning of the rebellion, he commented that "檀公三十六策,走是上計,汝父子唯應急走耳/檀公三十六策,走是上计,汝父子唯应急走耳", which can be translated literally as "of the thirty-six stratagems of Lord Tán, retreat was his best, you father and son should run for sure". Lord Tán here refers to general Tan Daoji of the Liu Song Dynasty, who was forced to retreat after his failed attack on Northern Wei, and Wáng mentioned his name in contempt as an example of cowardice.[2]

It should be noted that the number thirty-six was used by Wáng as a figure of speech in this context, and is meant to denote numerous stratagems instead of any specific number. Wáng's choice of this term was in reference to the I Ching, where six is the number of Yin that shared many characteristics with the dark schemes involved in military strategy. As thirty-six is the square of six, it therefore acted as a metaphor for numerous strategies.[2] Since Wáng was not referring to any thirty-six specific stratagems however, the thirty-six proverbs and their connection to military strategies and tactics are likely to have been created after the fact, with the collection only borrowing its name from Wáng's saying.[3]

The Thirty-Six Stratagems have variably been attributed to Sun Tzu from the Spring and Autumn Period of China, or Zhuge Liang of the Three Kingdoms period, but neither are regarded as the true author by historians. Instead, the prevailing view is that the Thirty-Six Stratagems may have originated in both written and oral history, with many different versions compiled by different authors throughout Chinese history. Some stratagems reference occurrences in the time of Sun Bin, approx. 150 years after Sun Wu's death.[3]

The original hand-copied paperback that is the basis of the current version was believed to have been discovered in China's Shaanxi province, of an unknown date and author, and put into print by a local publisher in 1941. The Thirty-Six Stratagems only came to the public's attention after a review of it was published in the Chinese Communist Party's Guangming Daily (光明日報/光明日报) newspaper on September 16, 1961. It was subsequently reprinted and distributed with growing popularity.[3]

Thirty-Six Stratagems

The Thirty-Six Stratagems are divided into a preface, six chapters containing six stratagems each, and an afterword that was incomplete with missing text. The first three chapters generally describe tactics for use in advantageous situations, whereas the last three chapters contain stratagems that are more suitable for disadvantageous situations. The original text of the Thirty-Six Stratagems has a laconic style that is common to Classical Chinese. Each proverb is accompanied by a short comment, no longer than a sentence or two, that explains how said proverb is applicable to military tactics. These 36 Chinese proverbs are related to 36 battle scenarios in Chinese history and folklore, predominantly of the Warring States Period and the Three Kingdoms Period.

Chapter 1: Winning Stratagems

Deceive the heavens to cross the ocean (瞞天過海/瞒天过海, Mán tiān guò hǎi)

Prepare too much and you lose sight of the big picture; what you see often you do not doubt. Yin (the art of deception) is in Yang (acting in open). Too much Yang (transparency) hides Yin (true ruses).

This stratagem references an episode in 643 AD, when Tang emperor Tang Gaozong Li Simin, baulked from crossing the sea to a campaign against Koguryo. His General Xue Rengui thought of a stratagem to get the Emperor across and allay his fear of seasickness: on a clear day, the Emperor was invited to meet a wise man. They entered through a dark tunnel into a hall where they feasted. After feasting several days, the Emperor heard the sound of waves and realised that he had been lured onto a ship! General Xue drew aside the curtains to reveal the ocean and confessed that they had already crossed the sea: Upon discovering this, the emperor decided to carry on and later completed the successful campaign.

This stratagem means that you can mask your real goals, by using the ruse of a fake goal that everyone takes for granted, until the real goal is achieved. Tactically, this is known as an 'open feint'; in front of everyone, you point west, when your goal is actually in the east. By the time everyone realised it, you have already achieved your goal. Harro von Senger notes in the German-Language "Die Liste" that to grasp the full meaning, it would be something like "to deceive the holy virgin Mary" in the West.

This stratagem makes use of the human failing to become unaware of common everyday activities, or events that appear normal. The best secrets are carried out in broad daylight. The best hoax is to repeat it so often that people are convinced that the next move is also a hoax. When this happens, it is the best moment to carry out one's previously hidden true objective.

Besiege Wèi to rescue Zhào (圍魏救趙/围魏救赵, Wéi Wèi jiù Zhào)

When the enemy is too strong to be attacked directly, then attack something he holds dear. Know that he cannot be superior in all things. Somewhere there is a gap in the armour, a weakness that can be attacked instead.

The origin of this proverb is from the Warring States Period. The state of Wèi attacked Zhao and laid siege to its capital Handan. Zhào turned to Qí for help, but the Qí general Sun Bin determined it would be unwise to meet the army of Wèi head on, so he instead attacked their capital at Daliang. The army of Wèi retreated in haste, and the tired troops were ambushed and defeated at the Battle of Guiling, with the Wèi general Pang Juan slain on the field. Note that this campaign is also described explicitly in the Art of War of Master Sun Bin the younger.

The idea here is to avoid a head on battle with a strong enemy, and instead strike at his weakness elsewhere. This will force the strong enemy to retreat in order to support his weakness. Battling against the now tired and low-morale enemy will give a much higher chance of success.

Kill with a borrowed knife (借刀殺人/借刀杀人, Jiè dāo shā rén)

Attack using the strength of another (in a situation where using one's own strength is not favourable). Trick an ally into attacking him, bribe an official to turn traitor, or use the enemy's own strength against him.

The idea here is to cause damage to the enemy by getting a 3rd party to do the deed.

Leisurely await for the laboured (以逸待勞/以逸待劳, Yǐ yì dài láo)

It is an advantage to choose the time and place for battle. In this way you know when and where the battle will take place, while your enemy does not. Encourage your enemy to expend his energy in futile quests while you conserve your strength. When he is exhausted and confused, you attack with energy and purpose.

The idea is to have your troops well-prepared for battle, in the same time that the enemy is rushing to fight against you. This will give your troops a huge advantage in the upcoming battle, of which you will get to select the time and place.

Loot a burning house (趁火打劫, Chèn huǒ dǎ jié)

When a country is beset by internal conflicts, when disease and famine ravage the population, when corruption and crime are rampant, then it will be unable to deal with an outside threat. This is the time to attack.

Keep gathering internal information about an enemy. If the enemy is currently in its weakest state ever, attack it without mercy and totally destroy it to prevent future troubles.

Make a sound in the east, then strike in the west (聲東擊西/声东击西, Shēng dōng jí xī)

In any battle the element of surprise can provide an overwhelming advantage. Even when face to face with an enemy, surprise can still be employed by attacking where he least expects it. To do this you must create an expectation in the enemy's mind through the use of a feint.

The idea here is to get the enemy to focus his forces in a location, and then attack elsewhere which would be weakly defended.

Chapter 2: Enemy Dealing Stratagems

Create something from nothing (無中生有/无中生有, Wú zhōng shēng yǒu)

A plain lie. Make somebody believe there was something when there is in fact nothing.

One method of using this stratagem is to create an illusion of something's existence, while it does not exist. Another method is to create an illusion that something does not exist, while it does.

Openly repair the gallery roads, but sneak through the passage of Chencang (暗渡陳倉/暗渡陈仓, Àn dù chén cāng)

Deceive the enemy with an obvious approach that will take a very long time, while surprising him by taking a shortcut and sneak up to him. As the enemy concentrates on the decoy, he will miss you sneaking up to him.

The phrase originated from the Chu-Han contention, where Liu Bang retreated to the lands of Sichuan to prepare for a confrontation with Xiang Yu. Once he was fully prepared, Liu Bang sent men to openly repair the gallery roads he had destroyed earlier, while secretly moving his troops towards Guanzhong through the small town of Chencang instead. When Xiang Yu received news of Liu Bang repairing the gallery roads, he dismissed the threat since he knew the repairs would take years to complete. This allowed Liu Bang to retake Guanzhong by surprise, and eventually led to his victory over Xiang Yu and the birth of the Han Dynasty.

This tactic is an extension of the "Make a sound in the east, then strike in the west" tactic. But instead of simply spreading misinformation to draw the enemy's attention, physical baits are used to increase the enemy's certainty on the misinformation. These baits must be easily seen by the enemy, to ensure that they draw the enemy's attention. At the same time, the baits must act as if what they meant to do what they were falsely doing, to avoid drawing the enemy's suspicion.

Watch the fires burning across the river (隔岸觀火/隔岸观火, Gé àn guān huǒ)

Delay entering the field of battle until all the other players have become exhausted fighting amongst themselves. Then go in at full strength and pick up the pieces.

Hide a knife behind a smile (笑裏藏刀/笑里藏刀, Xiào lǐ cáng dāo)

Charm and ingratiate yourself to your enemy. When you have gained his trust, move against him in secret.

Sacrifice the plum tree to preserve the peach tree (李代桃僵, Lǐ dài táo jiāng)

There are circumstances in which you must sacrifice short-term objectives in order to gain the long-term goal. This is the scapegoat stratagem whereby someone else suffers the consequences so that the rest do not.

Take the opportunity to pilfer a goat (順手牽羊/顺手牵羊, Shùn shǒu qiān yáng)

While carrying out your plans be flexible enough to take advantage of any opportunity that presents itself, however small, and avail yourself of any profit, however slight.

Chapter 3: Attacking Stratagems

Stomp the grass to scare the snake (打草驚蛇/打草惊蛇, Dá cǎo jīng shé)

Do something unaimed, but spectacular ("hitting the grass") to provoke a response of the enemy ("startle the snake"), thereby giving away his plans or position, or just taunt him. Do something unusual, strange, and unexpected as this will arouse the enemy's suspicion and disrupt his thinking. More widely used as "[Do not] startle the snake by hitting the grass". An imprudent act will give your position or intentions away to the enemy.

Borrow a corpse to resurrect the soul (借屍還魂/借尸还魂, Jiè shī huán hún)

Take an institution, a technology, a method, or even an ideology that has been forgotten or discarded and appropriate it for your own purpose. Revive something from the past by giving it a new purpose or bring to life old ideas, customs, or traditions and reinterpret them to fit your purposes.

Entice the tiger to leave its mountain lair (調虎離山/调虎离山, Diào hǔ lí shān)

Never directly attack an opponent whose advantage is derived from its position. Instead lure him away from his position thus separating him from his source of strength.

In order to capture, one must let loose (欲擒故縱/欲擒故纵, Yù qín gū zòng)

Cornered prey will often mount a final desperate attack. To prevent this you let the enemy believe he still has a chance for freedom. His will to fight is thus dampened by his desire to escape. When in the end the freedom is proven a falsehood the enemy's morale will be defeated and he will surrender without a fight.

Tossing out a brick to get a jade gem (拋磚引玉/抛砖引玉, Pāo zhuān yǐn yù)

Bait someone by making him believe he gains something or just make him react to it ("toss out a brick") and obtain something valuable from him in return ("get a jade gem").

This proverb is based on a story involving two famous poets of the Tang Dynasty. There was a great poet named Zhao Gu (趙嘏) and another lesser poet by the name of Chang Jian (常建). While Chang Jian was travelling in Suzhou, he heard news that Zhao Gu would be visiting a temple in the area. Chang Jian wished to learn from the master poet, so he devised a plan and went to the temple in advance, then wrote a poem on the temple walls with only two of the four lines completed, hoping Zhao Gu would see it and finish the poem. Zhao Gu acted as Chang Jian foresaw, and from this story came the proverb.

Defeat the enemy by capturing their chief (擒賊擒王/擒贼擒王, Qín zéi qín wáng)

If the enemy's army is strong but is allied to the commander only by money, superstition or threats, then take aim at the leader. If the commander falls the rest of the army will disperse or come over to your side. If, however, they are allied to the leader through loyalty then beware, the army can continue to fight on after his death out of vengeance.

Chapter 4: Chaos Stratagems

Remove the firewood from under the pot (釜底抽薪, Fǔ dǐ chōu xīn)

If something must be destroyed, destroy the source.

Catch a fish while the water is disturbed (混水摸魚/混水摸鱼, Hún shuǐ mō yú)

Create confusion and use this confusion to further your own goals.

Slough off the cicada's golden shell (金蟬脱殼/金蝉脱壳, Jīn chán tuō qiào)

It's a stratagem mainly used to escape from enemy of a more superior force. One use this stratagem by slough off one's shell, which tricked the enemy to believe to have grasped one's essential. Mask yourself. Either leave flamboyant traits behind, thus going incognito; or just masquerade yourself and create an illusion to fit your goals and distract others.

Shut the door to catch the thief (關門捉賊/关门捉贼, Guān mén zhōu zéi)

To capture your enemy, or more generally in fighting wars, to deliver the final blow to your enemy, you must plan prudently if you want to succeed. Do not rush into action. Before you "move in for the kill", first cut off your enemy's escape routes, and cut off any routes through which outside help can reach them.

Befriend a distant state while attacking a neighbour (遠交近攻/远交近攻, Yuǎn jiāo jìn gōng)

It is known that nations that border each other become enemies while nations separated by distance and obstacles make better allies. When you are the strongest in one field, your greatest threat is from the second strongest in your field, not the strongest from another field.

Obtain safe passage to conquer the State of Guo (假道伐虢, Jiǎ dào fá Guó)

Borrow the resources of an ally to attack a common enemy. Once the enemy is defeated, use those resources to turn on the ally that lent you them in the first place. See Duke Xian of Jin.

Chapter 5: Proximate Stratagems

Replace the beams with rotten timbers (偷梁換柱/偷梁换柱, Tōu liáng huàn zhù)

Disrupt the enemy's formations, interfere with their methods of operations, change the rules in which they are used to follow, go contrary to their standard training. In this way you remove the supporting pillar, the common link that makes a group of men an effective fighting force.

Point at the mulberry tree while cursing the locust tree (指桑罵槐/指桑骂槐, Zhǐ sāng mà huái)

To discipline, control, or warn others whose status or position excludes them from direct confrontation; use analogy and innuendo. Without directly naming names, those accused cannot retaliate without revealing their complicity.

Feign madness but keep your balance (假痴不癲/假痴不癫, Jiǎ chī bù diān)

Hide behind the mask of a fool, a drunk, or a madman to create confusion about your intentions and motivations. Lure your opponent into underestimating your ability until, overconfident, he drops his guard. Then you may attack.

Remove the ladder when the enemy has ascended to the roof (上屋抽梯, Shàng wū chōu tī)

With baits and deceptions, lure your enemy into treacherous terrain. Then cut off his lines of communication and avenue of escape. To save himself, he must fight both your own forces and the elements of nature.

Deck the tree with false blossoms (樹上開花/树上开花, Shù shàng kāi huā)

Tying silk blossoms on a dead tree gives the illusion that the tree is healthy. Through the use of artifice and disguise, make something of no value appear valuable; of no threat appear dangerous; of no use appear useful. This is the same stratagem as Potemkin villages.

Make the host and the guest exchange roles (反客為主/反客为主, Fǎn kè wéi zhǔ)

Usurp leadership in a situation where you are normally subordinate. Infiltrate your target. Initially, pretend to be a guest to be accepted, but develop from inside and become the owner later.

Chapter 6: Defeat Stratagems

The beauty trap (honey trap) (美人計/美人计, Měi rén jì)

Send your enemy beautiful women to cause discord within his camp. This stratagem can work on three levels. First, the ruler becomes so enamoured with the beauty that he neglects his duties and allows his vigilance to wane. Second, other males at court will begin to display aggressive behaviour that inflames minor differences hindering co-operation and destroying morale. Third, other females at court, motivated by jealousy and envy, begin to plot intrigues further exacerbating the situation.

The empty fort strategy (空城計/空城计, Kōng chéng jì)

When the enemy is superior in numbers and your situation is such that you expect to be overrun at any moment, then drop all presence of military preparedness, act calmly and appear disrespect of the enemy, so that the enemy will think you have hidden huge power and you want to trap them into the fort with your calm and easiness. This has to be used when in most of the cases, you do have huge power hidden under the disguise and you only play the real empty rarely. Use this against people who are really smart[4].

Let the enemy's own spy sow discord in the enemy camp (反間計/反间计, Fǎn jiàn jì)

Undermine your enemy's ability to fight by secretly causing discord between him and his friends, allies, advisors, family, commanders, soldiers, and population. While he is preoccupied settling internal disputes, his ability to attack or defend, is compromised.

Inflict injury on oneself to win the enemy's trust (苦肉計/苦肉计, Kǔ ròu jì)

Pretending to be injured has two possible applications. In the first, the enemy is lulled into relaxing his guard since he no longer considers you to be an immediate threat. The second is a way of ingratiating yourself to your enemy by pretending the injury was caused by a mutual enemy.

Chain stratagems (連環計/连环计, Lián huán jì)

In important matters, one should use several stratagems applied simultaneously after another as in a chain of stratagems. Keep different plans operating in an overall scheme; however, in this manner if any one stratagem fails, then the chain breaks and the whole scheme fails.

If everything else fails, retreat (走為上/走为上, Zǒu wéi shàng)

If it becomes obvious that your current course of action will lead to defeat, then retreat and regroup. When your side is losing, there are only three choices remaining: surrender, compromise, or escape. Surrender is complete defeat, compromise is half defeat, but escape is not defeat. As long as you are not defeated, you still have a chance.

References

1. ^ "Original Text of the Biography of Wáng Jìngzé, Book of Qi (Traditional Chinese)". http://www.hoolulu.com/zh/25shi/07nanqishu/t-026.htm. Retrieved 2006-11-27.
2. ^ a b "Introduction to the Thirty-Six Strategies (Traditional Chinese)". http://www.millionbook.net/xd/m/mananchun/ysyh/145.htm. Retrieved 2006-11-27.
3. ^ a b c "Exploring the Thirty-Six Strategies (Simplified Chinese)". Chinese Strategic Science Network. 2006-07-11. http://www.szbf.net/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=1490.
4. ^ "Empty City Stratagem" (in English). BeijingTouree.com. http://www.beijingtouree.com/index.php/chinese-culture/history-beijing/40-history/303-the-empty-city-stratagem. Retrieved 2008-09-29.

* The Book of Stratagems by Harro von Senger, ISBN 0140169547
* The 36 Stratagems for Business: Achieve Your Objectives Through Hidden and Unconventional Strategies and Tactics by Harro von Senger. ISBN 9781904879466
* Greatness in Simplicity: The 36 Stratagems and Chinese Enterprises, Strategic Thinking by Cungen GE, ISBN 7802076420

Go Rin No Sho : The Book of Five Rings


The Book of Five Rings
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia



Go Rin No Sho calligraphed in Kanji . Musashi strived for as great a mastery in that art as in swordsmanshipThe Book of Five Rings (五輪書, Go Rin No Sho?) is a text on kenjutsu and the martial arts in general, written by the samurai warrior Miyamoto Musashi circa 1645. It is considered a classic treatise on military strategy, much like Sun Tzu's The Art of War and Chanakya's Arthashastra. There have been various translations made over the years, and it enjoys an audience considerably broader than only that of martial artists: for instance, some business leaders find its discussion of conflict and taking the advantage to be relevant to their work. The modern-day Hyōhō Niten Ichi-ryū employs it as a manual of technique and philosophy.

Musashi establishes a "no-nonsense" theme throughout the text. For instance, he repeatedly remarks that technical flourishes are excessive, and contrasts worrying about such things with the principle that all technique is simply a method of cutting down one's opponent. He also continually makes the point that the understandings expressed in the book are important for combat on any scale, whether a one-on-one duel or a massive battle. Descriptions of principles are often followed by admonitions to "investigate this thoroughly" through practice, rather than try to learn by merely reading.

Miyamoto Musashi in his prime, wielding two bokken.Musashi describes and advocates a two-sword style (nitōjutsu): that is, wielding both katana and wakizashi, contrary to the more traditional method of wielding the katana two-handed. However, he only explicitly describes wielding two swords in a section on fighting against many adversaries. The stories of his many duels rarely reference Musashi himself wielding two swords, although as mostly oral traditions their details may be rather inaccurate. Some suggest that Musashi's meaning was not so much wielding two swords 'simultaneously', but rather acquiring the proficiency to (singly) wield either sword in either hand as the need arose.[citation needed] However, Musashi states within the volume that one should train with a long sword in each hand, thereby training the body and improving one's ability to use two blades simultaneously.


The five books

Although it is difficult to grasp it from the book, Go Rin No Sho, these books are actually the teachings which Musashi preached to his students in his own dōjō. Despite the ideas from others, the books are not based on any other school of teaching.

The five "books" refer to the idea that there are different elements of battle, just as there are different physical elements in life, as described by Buddhism, Shinto, and other Eastern religions. The Five books below are descriptions by Musashi of exact methods, or techniques which are described by such elements.

The term "Ichi School", which is referred to in the book, Go Rin No Sho, when referring to such books, refers to "Niten No Ichi Ryu", or "Ni Ten Ichi Ryu", which literally translated, means "Two heaven, one school", although the translation could be seen by many as "Two Swords, One spirit", or "Two Swords, One Entity". However, the translation of "Two Swords, one Dragon" was thought to be a transliteral misinterpretation of the Kanji "Ryu".

The Book of Earth chapter serves as an introduction, and metaphorically discusses martial arts, leadership, and training as building a house.

The Book of Water chapter describes Musashi's style, Ni-ten ichi-ryu, or "Two Heavens, One Style". It describes some basic technique and fundamental principles.
The Book of Fire chapter refers to the heat of battle, and discusses matters such as different types of timing.

The Book of Wind chapter is something of a pun, since the Japanese character can mean both "wind" and "style" (e.g., of martial arts). It discusses what Musashi considers to be the failings of various contemporary schools of swordfighting.
The Book of No-thing chapter is a short epilogue, describing, in more esoteric terms, Musashi's probably Zen-influenced thoughts on consciousness and the correct mindset.


The Book of Earth

The ground book, according to Go Rin No Sho, is mentioned as the book which refers expressly to Strategy which was taught by Musashi at the Ichi School, and is said to be the way to distinguish the way through "Sword-Fencing", or "Swordsmanship". The idea of strategy mentioned in this book is that of situational strategy, such as techniques and "tricks" to use when fighting indoors, outdoors, on a horse, or in various conditions. The book, or Discipline is that of strategies taught to Ichi school students who would be encouraged to be very astute in their study and strategy:

Know the smallest things and the biggest things, the shallowest things and the deepest things. As if it were a straight road mapped out on the ground ... These things cannot be explained in detail. From one thing, know ten thousand things. When you attain the Way of strategy there will not be one thing you cannot see. You must study hard.

Upon their mastery of Strategy and timing listed in the five books, Musashi states that you will be able to defeat ten men as easy as you could defeat one, and questions "When you have reached this point, will it not mean that you are invincible?"

The strategies listed in this Discipline, or book, relate to situations requiring different weapons and tactics, such as indoor weapons. Musashi states that the use of halberd-like naginata and spears are purely for on the field, whereas the longsword and accompanying short-sword can be used in most environments, such as horseback, fierce battle, and others.

Musashi also mentions the Gun as having no equal on the battlefield. It is the supreme weapon on the battlefield, until swords clash—then it becomes useless. He also notes that the gun is somewhat lesser than the Bow, as particularly at that time, guns were not very accurate at ranges any longer than point-blank, as well as the obvious disadvantage that you could not see the bullet and adjust your aim as you would with a bow. Not to mention, in the 1600's the gap in reloading speeds between skilled archers and skilled gunmen was rather apparent.

One of the principles of the Niten Ichi-ryū is that one should be versed in many weaponry skills; Musashi indicates that within battle you should not overuse one weapon—this is as bad as using the weapon poorly, as it becomes easy for an enemy to find a weakness in your style after countless uses of the same weapon.

Timing as explained by Musashi is the core principle in strategy which is listed in the Ground Book. The idea of timing explained within the ground book is that you must be able to adapt your strategy to timing with your skill, in that you must know when to attack and when not to attack.

In The Book of Five Rings he writes on timing:

"Timing is important in dancing and pipe or string music, for they are in rhythm only if timing is good. Timing and rhythm are also involved in the military arts, shooting bows and guns, and riding horses. In all skills and abilities there is timing.... There is timing in the whole life of the warrior, in his thriving and declining, in his harmony and discord. Similarly, there is timing in the Way of the merchant, in the rise and fall of capital. All things entail rising and falling timing. You must be able to discern this. In strategy there are various timing considerations. From the outset you must know the applicable timing and the inapplicable timing, and from among the large and small things and the fast and slow timings find the relevant timing, first seeing the distance timing and the background timing. This is the main thing in strategy. It is especially important to know the background timing, otherwise your strategy will become uncertain."

The Book of Water

The water book concerns strategy, but various other factors which perhaps a warrior reading the book should take into consideration, such as spirituality, religion and one's outlook on life. The meaning of "Water" in relation to life is "Flexibility". Water demonstrates natural flexibility as it changes to conform with the boundaries which contain it, seeking the most efficient and productive path. So also should one possess the ability to change in accordance with one’s own situation to easily shift between disciplines, methods and options, when presented with new information. A person should master many aspects of life allowing them to possess both balance and flexibility.

The spiritual bearing in strategy, which Musashi writes about concerns your temperament and spirituality whilst in the midst of, or in formulation of a battle. Being a buddhist, most of what is written in the section concerning spirituality refers to principles of calmness, tranquility and spiritual balance;

In strategy your spiritual bearing must not be any different from normal. Both in fighting and in everyday life you should be determined though calm.
This balance refers to what could be thought of as yin and yang within yourself when fighting. The over-familiarity or over-use of one weapon is discouraged by Musashi, as it would be seen to reveal your spirituality to your enemy; the idea being a perfectly balanced spirit is also a perfectly balanced physical presence, and neither creates weakness nor reveals it to your enemy.

The spirituality and balance is something which Musashi notes that you should take advantage of during battle. As small people know the spirituality of Big people, they can thus note differences and weaknesses between each other. This is something which although seems easy, is said to change when on the battlefield, as you must know to both adjust your spiritual balance according to what is around you, and to perceive the balance of those around you, and take advantage accordingly.

Again, as your spirit should be balanced, so too should your various techniques be honed to a perfectly balanced demeanour. In terms of stance, much like balance within the trooper, Musashi notes that stance is an important part of strategy, or battle; Adopt a stance with the head erect, neither hanging down, nor looking up, nor twisted.. This is part of what Musashi notes as wedging in.

In regards to the Gaze of someone, he notes that a person must be able to perceive that which is all around him, without moving their eyeballs noticeably, which is said to be a skill which takes an enormous amount of practice to perfect. He notes that this is again one of the most important parts of strategy, as well as being able to see things which are close to you, such as the technique of an enemy, or far away, such as arriving troops, or enemies, as that is the precursor of battle, in that your actions go off what you see.

Attitudes of swordsmanship

Upper
Middle
Lower
Right Side
Left Side

The five attitudes of swordsmanship, are referred to as the five classifications of areas for attack on the human body, areas which are noted for their advantages when striking at an enemy, and are said to be thought of by the strategist when in situations where, for any reason you should not be able to strike them, then your mind should adjust accordingly;

Your attitude should be large or small according to the situation. Upper, Lower and Middle attitudes are decisive. Left Side and Right Side attitudes are fluid. Left and Right attitudes should be used if there is an obstruction overhead or to one side. The decision to use Left or Right depends on the place.
As each is thought of as an attitude, it could be thought of that Musashi means to practice with each "attitude" so that you do not become over-reliant upon one, something which Musashi repeatedly notes as being worse than bad technique.

"No Attitude" refers to those strategists who do not particularly go with the use of the "Five Attitudes", and prefer to simply go without the attitudes of the long sword, and focus entirely on technique, as opposed to focusing on both Technique and the five attitudes, similar to basically "taking chances" as opposed to "making chances".

The attitude of "Existing - Non Existing", mixes the Five Attitudes with the Attitude of "No Attitude", meaning that the user of the longsword uses the techniques and principles of both at whichever moment he or she finds most opportunistic.

"In-One Timing" refers to the technique of biding your time until you can find a suitable gap in the enemies' defense, to which you will deliver one fatal blow to the enemy. Although this is said to be difficult, Musashi notes that masters of this Technique are usually Masters of the Five attitudes because they must be perceptive of weaknesses. It is rumoured that Musashi disgraced a former sword master by using such a technique with a Bokken, although there are no descriptions mentioning "In one" timing.[citation needed]

"Abdomen Timing of Two" refers to feinting an attack, then striking an enemy as they are retracting from an attack, hitting them in the abdomen with the correct timing of either two moves or two seconds. Although the technique seems relatively simple, Musashi lists this as one of the hardest techniques to time correctly.

"No Design, No Conception" refers to When word and actions are spontaneously the same.. Aside from this philosophical approach to the meaning, the technique is relatively simple to explain ; if you are in a deadlock with the enemy, using the force from the cut, you push with your body, spirit, and using Disciplines outlined in the Void Book, to knock the enemy over.

This is the most important method of hitting. It is often used. You must train hard to understand it.

"Flowing Water Cut" technique refers to if you come into a fight with an enemy of a similar level to you in swordsmanship. When attacking fast, Musashi notes that you will always be at stalemate, so like Stagnant water, you must cut as slowly as possible with your long sword. At the beginning of this technique you and your opponent will be searching for an opening within each other's defense. When your opponent either tries to push off your sword, or to hasten back as to disengage it, you must first expand your whole body and your mind. By moving your body first and then that of your sword, you will be able to strike powerfully and broadly with a movement that seems to reflect the natural flow of water. Ease and confidence will be attained when this technique is continuously practiced upon.

"Continuous Cut" refers to when you are again faced with stalemate within a duel, where your swords clasp together. In one motion when your sword springs away from theirs, Musashi says to use a continuous motion to slash their head, body and legs.

"Fire and Stone's Cut" refers to when your swords clash together. Without raising your sword even a little, you cut as strongly as possible. This means cutting quickly with hands body and legs.

"Red Leafs Cut" refers to knocking down the enemy's long sword in the spirit of the "No Design, No Conception" cut.

The Book of Fire

The fire book refers to fighting methods, mostly away from specific fighting techniques listed in the Water book. It goes into a broader scope in terms of hints as to assess a situation, as well as specific situational instructions.

He notes obvious advantages of Armor, as well as preparedness before a duel or battle. This does not apply to just one man, but a whole group of men:

As one man can defeat ten men, so can one thousand men defeat ten thousand. However, you can become a master of strategy by training alone with a sword, so that you can understand the enemy's stratagems, his strength and resources, and come to appreciate how to apply strategy to beat ten thousand enemies.
The dependence of location according to the Go Rin No Sho is crucial. You must be in a place where Man-made objects such as buildings, towers, castles and such do not obstruct your view, as well as facing or standing in a position where the sun or moon does not affect your vision. This is purely so that your vision is focused on nothing but the enemy, and thus there is more concentration upon the enemies' stratagems. Musashi also seems to note the age old strategy of the High Ground:

You must look down on the enemy, and take up your attitude on slightly higher places.

Other kinds of tactics which Musashi tells of are way of ensuring that the enemy is at a disadvantage ; Forcing yourself on the bad-side of a trooper; The left side being difficult for a Right-handed soldier or warrior. Other disadvantages, such as forcing enemies into footholds, swamps, ditches, and other difficult terrain which forces the enemy to be unsure and uncertain of his situation.

These things cannot be clearly explained in words. You must research what is written here. In these three ways of forestalling, you must judge the situation. This does not mean that you always attack first; but if the enemy attacks first you can lead him around. In strategy, you have effectively won when you forestall the enemy, so you must train well to attain this..

Ken No Sen, or "Attacking", is the most obvious method of forestalling an enemy, in that a head on collision forces both parties to a standstill. Although it is not mentioned, Musashi must have been well aware that this method would also be the most probable to have a higher death count to others, due to the sheer mass of enemies, where more than one enemy can attack a single soldier or trooper.

As the name suggests, Tai No Sen (Waiting for the Initiative) is invented for very opportunistic and decided battles between parties. The main idea being to feign weakness as to open a weak spot, or Achilles' heel in the opposing force, and then regrouping to exploit such a hole by attacking deep within the enemy's party. Although it is not mentioned, this would most likely be to kill the Officer of the highest rank, as an attempt to remove the tactical centre of a group of soldiers; a method particularly useful for Musashi or others if attacking a general directly, which would signal the end of the battle upon his defeat.

Only a small amount of text is written about Tai Tai No Sen (Accompanying and Forestalling). Albeit very confusing, the idea of Tai Tai No Sen is circumventing an ambush or quick attack from the enemy by taking the initiative, and attacking in full force. Musashi admits himself that this is a difficult thing to explain.

Although there are other methods, they are mostly situational methods relating to the crossing of rough terrain, and battling within such rough terrain. Although it spreads over two or more paragraphs, most information is common sense, relating to caution and avoidance of such situations.

The idea of timing, as with singular battles, is known as the most important part of attacking next to the skill of participants. However, the type of timing in this instance is somewhat different from the timing noted in The Ground Book, as it notes looking at the various physical factors which affect an enemy during battle, such as determining if the strength is waning or rising within a group of troopers.

The idea of treading down the sword is a very simple technique; Quashing an enemy's attack before it starts by using a form of charging and then attacking under the veil of gunpowder smoke, and arrow fire, the initial attacks used when starting battles. Individually it refers to attacking the enemy's sword, killing it, removing it from play, and a technique of controlling it through direct blade on blade contact.

Like Musashi mentions in his philosophical style, there is causality of collapse; the collapse of houses, empires, and so on. As there is collapse within an enemy, such as waning in his numbers, Musashi notes that to observe such events and use them to your advantage, such as by gaining from loss, or vice versa.

Interestingly, he notes that an enemy's formation can fall if they lose rhythm. It was known that in such battles, drummers drummed a tune for their other fellow soldiers to march to, should the rhythm be lost, leading to "collapse when their rhythm becomes deranged."

The Book of Wind

Whereas most of the information given in the previous books is useful in such a way that it could still be applicable today, this book is primarily concerned with the specific details about other strategies that existed at the time. The broader lesson from this book is that an important part of understanding your own way is to understand the way of your opponent as precisely as possible.

Musashi notes that although most schools have secret and ancient strategies, most forms are derivative of other martial arts. Their similarities and differences evolved through situational factors, such as indoor or outdoor duelling, the style adapting to the school. He indicates that his appraisal may be one sided because the only school he had interest for was his own, and, in a way, he does not see parallels to his own creation and work. However, he still admits that without basic understanding of these alternate techniques, you will not be able to learn Ni Ten Ichi Ryu, probably for reasons of finding the wrongs in other techniques, and righting them within yourself in Ni Ten Ichi Ryu.

The main difference that Musashi notes between the Ichi School and other Strategists and schools, is that other schools do not teach the "broader" meaning of strategy, that above sword-fencing; "Some of the world's strategists are concerned only with sword-fencing, and limit their training to flourishing the long sword and carriage of the body. " The book has many paragraphs on the subject of other school's techniques, and much of the text lists the ways that other schools do not conform to the ideals which he himself writes about in the Book of five rings, such as Over-reliance, or over-familiarity with a weapon, as well as to do with footwork, sight, and other methods described in previous disciplines.

The Book of Void

Although short, the void book lists, philosophically, the nature of both human knowledge and other things. The void book expressly deals with "That which cannot be seen";

"By knowing things that exist, you can know that which does not exist."
The Book of No-thing, according to Musashi, is the true meaning of the strategy of Ni Ten Ichi Ryu; it seems very esoteric in nature, in that he seems to note that you must learn to perceive that which you cannot understand or comprehend. He notes that in this Void, what can be comprehended are things which we do and see, such as the way of the warrior, martial arts and Ni Ten Ichi Ryu. At the same time, in the Void, things we do not do or see (which he calls Spirit), are part of the information which we perceive on a conscious level, but with which we have no physical relationship. It's arguable whether Musashi is referring to religious spirituality or if he is actually explaining a way to live your life and process thoughts.

"In the void is virtue, and no evil. Wisdom has existence, principle has existence, the Way has existence, spirit is nothingness."
In the above quote Musashi speaks of "virtue and no evil." This may mean "goodness and banishment of evil" or "purpose and non-existence of good and evil", and the exact meaning is open to debate.

Philosophical methods

Crimson-Leaves Strike

Within this method, you will cause your adversary's sword to drop through a strike from your sword, then bring yourself immediately back to a readiness to strike. This method is combined with The Strike of Nonthought, in which you will always strike with true force by executing your sword toward the ground when your opponent's sword is to drop.

Autumn Monkey's Body

Within this method, you are to start off by expressing a posture within combat in which you are not to use your hands. You are to think of getting your body close to your opponent before striking him. However, if you think of reaching out both of your hands, your body will remain distant. This is to why you must always think of getting your body in close quickly to the enemy. When at a time in which you are distant, at which you will exchange blows of the sword, it will be rather easy to attain closeness towards your opponent.

Thomas Cleary translates this technique as "Body of the Short-Armed Monkey".

Blow Like a Spark from a Stone

If you are currently within a situation in which you and your opponent's swords are to clash, you must strike extremely hard without raising your sword to any extent. This is 'The Blow Like a Spark from a Stone' technique. If you are to perform this technique, you must first strike quickly with the three combined forces of your legs, your hands, and your body. This blow will be rather difficult to perform if you do not train within it at frequent times. If you are to reflect diligent training, you will be able to increase the overall force of the technique's impact.

Body of Lacquer and Paste

Within this technique, one's objective is to get close to the opponent and stick to him. When one is to do this, one must first behave as though one had been strongly glued to him with one's feet, head, and body. It is generally known that within combat, most fighters will have a tendency to have their body hang back while their heads and feet are extended forward. One must attempt to paste one's body against the opponent's without leaving any area in which the bodies are not touching.

Chance-Opening Blow

When you first start off by striking, your opponent will try to parry by hitting or by blocking your sword. At this point in time, you need to completely equip yourself into the action of striking with your sword, and strike whenever you may see an opening, whether it may be the legs, arms, or head. Following the single way of the sword and performing a strike such as this is known as the Chance-Opening Blow. This technique will be useful within any moment within swordsmanship, so it should be trained on regularly.

Strike of Nonthought

You should always make your mind into a mind that is striking, and your body into a body that is striking when you and your adversary are about to launch an attack. If this method is followed, your hand will attain movement through emptiness, with speed and power, without taking note of any point in which movement had begun.




Miyamoto Musashi (宮本 武蔵?) (c. 1584–June 13 (Japanese calendar: May 19), 1645), also known as Shinmen Takezō, Miyamoto Bennosuke, or by his Buddhist name Niten Dōraku[1], was a Japanese swordsman and samurai famed for his duels and distinctive style. Musashi, as he was often simply known, became renowned through stories of his excellent swordsmanship in numerous duels, even from a very young age. He was the founder of the Hyōhō Niten Ichi-ryū or Niten-ryū style of swordsmanship and the author of The Book of Five Rings (五輪書, Go Rin No Sho?), a book on strategy, tactics, and philosophy that is still studied today.


Biography

Birth

The details of Miyamoto Musashi's early life are difficult to verify. Musashi himself simply states in Gorin no Sho that he was born in Harima Province.[2] Niten Ki (an early biography of Musashi) supports the theory that Musashi was born in 1584: "[He] was born in Banshū, in Tenshō 12 [1584], the Year of the Monkey."[3] The historian Kamiko Tadashi, commenting on Musashi's text, notes: "[...]Munisai was Musashi's father...he lived in Miyamoto village, in the Yoshino district [of Mimasaka Province]. Musashi was most probably born here."[4] His childhood name was Bennosuke 弁之助.

Musashi gives his full name and title in Gorin no Sho as "Shinmen Musashi no Kami Fujiwara no Genshin."[5] His father, Shinmen Munisai 新免無二斎, was an accomplished martial artist and master of the sword and jutte (also jitte).[6] Munisai, in turn, was the son of Hirata Shōgen 平田将監, a vassal of Shinmen Iga no Kami, the lord of Takeyama Castle, in the Yoshino district of Mimasaka Province.[7] Hirata was relied upon by Lord Shinmen, and so was allowed to use the Shinmen name. As for "Musashi," Musashi no Kami was a court title, making him the nominal governor of Musashi province. "Fujiwara" was the lineage from which Musashi claimed nominal descent.

Munisai and Musashi's birth date

Mysteriously, Munisai's tomb says he died in 1580, which obviously conflicts with the accepted birth date of 1584 for Musashi. Further muddying the waters, according to the genealogy of the extant Miyamoto family, Musashi was born in 1582. Kenji Tokitsu has suggested that the accepted birth date of 1584 for Musashi is wrong, as it is primarily based on a literal reading of the introduction to the Go Rin No Sho where Musashi states that the years of his life "add up to 60" (yielding the twelfth year of the Tensho era, or 1584, when working backwards from the well-documented date of composition), when it should be taken in a more literary and imprecise sense, indicating not a specific age but merely that Musashi was in his sixties when he wrote it.

Because of the uncertainty centering on Munisai (when he died, whether he was truly Musashi's father, etc.), Musashi's mother is known with even less confidence. Here are a few possibilities:

Munisai's tomb was correct. He died in 1580, leaving two daughters; his wife adopted a recently born child, from the Akamatsu clan, intended to succeed Munisai at his jitte school. Omasa, Munisai's widow, was not truly Musashi's mother.
The tomb was wrong. Munisai lived a good deal longer, later than 1590 possibly. Musashi, then, was born to Munisai's first wife, Yoshiko (daughter to Bessho Shigeharu, who formerly controlled Hirafuku village until he lost a battle in 1578 to Yamanaka Shikanosuke). Munisai divorced her after Musashi's birth, whereupon she decamped for her father's house, leaving Musashi with Munisai. Musashi grew up treating Munisai's second wife, Omasa (daughter to Lord Shinmen) as his mother. This second scenario is laid out in an entry to the Tasumi family's genealogy.
The daughter of Bessho Shigeharu first married Hirata Muni and was divorced from him a few years later. After that she married Tasumi Masahisa. The second wife of Tasumi Masahisa was the mother of Miyamoto Musashi. Musashi's childhood name was Hirata Den. He later became famous on account of his swordsmanship. During his childhood, he went to Hirafuku to find his real mother. He moved in with the Tasumi family.
—[8]

A variant of this second theory is based on the fact that the tombstone states that Omasa gave birth to Musashi on 4 March 1584, and died of it. Munisai then remarried to Yoshiko. They divorced, as in the second theory, but Yoshiko took Musashi, which was 7 at the time, with her, and married Tasumi Masahisa.
Kenji Tokitsu prefers to assume a birth date of 1581, which avoids the necessity of assuming the tombstone to be erroneous (although this poses the problem of from whom then Musashi received the transmission of the family martial art).

Upbringing

Regardless of the truth about Musashi's ancestry, when Musashi was seven years old, the boy was raised by his uncle, Dorinbo (or Dorin), in Shoreian temple, three kilometers (~1.8 mi.) from Hirafuku. Both Dorin and Musashi's uncle by marriage — Tasumi — educated him in Buddhism and basic skills such as writing and reading. This education is possibly the basis for Yoshikawa Eiji's fictional education of Musashi by the historical Zen monk Takuan. He was apparently trained by Munisai in the sword, and in the family art of the jitte. This training did not last for a very long time, as in 1589, Munisai was ordered by Shinmen Sokan to kill Munisai's student, Honiden Gekinosuke. The Honiden family was displeased, and so Munisai was forced to move four kilometers (~2.5 mi.) away to the village of Kawakami.

In 1592, Munisai died, although Tokitsu believes that the person who died at this time was really Hirata Takehito.

Musashi contracted eczema in his infancy, and this adversely affected his appearance.[citation needed] Another story claims that he never took a bath because he did not want to be surprised unarmed. While the former claim may or may not have some basis in reality, the latter seems improbable.[9] An unwashed member of the warrior caste would not have been received as a guest by such famous houses as Honda, Ogasawara and Hosokawa. These and many other details are likely embellishments that were added to his legend, or misinterpretations of literature describing him.

His father's fate is uncertain, but it is thought that he died at the hands of one of Musashi's later adversaries, who was punished or even killed for treating Musashi's father badly. However, there are no exact details of Musashi's life, since Musashi's only writings are those related to strategy and technique.

Training in swordsmanship

Miyamoto Musashi having his fortune told. Print by Utagawa KuniyoshiThe name "Musashi" was thought to be taken from the name of a warrior monk named Musashibō Benkei who served under Minamoto no Yoshitsune, but this is unconfirmed.

It's said that he may have studied at the Yoshioka ryu school, which was also said to be a school Musashi defeated single-handedly during his later years, although this is very uncertain. He did have formal training either by his father until he was 7 years old or from his uncle beginning at the age of 7. Ultimately the name was taken from his own original kanji, 武蔵, which can be read as Takezō or as Musashi, as stated in Eiji Yoshikawa's book Musashi.

First duel

I have trained in the way of strategy since my youth, and at the age of thirteen I fought a duel for the first time. My opponent was called Arima Kihei, a sword adept of the Shinto ryū, and I defeated him. At the age of sixteen I defeated a powerful adept by the name of Akiyama, who came from Tajima Province. At the age of twenty-one I went up to Kyōtō and fought duels with several adepts of the sword from famous schools, but I never lost.

—Miyamoto Musashi, Go Rin No Sho
According to the introduction of The Book of Five Rings, Musashi states that his first successful duel was at the age of thirteen, against a samurai named Arima Kihei who fought using the Kashima Shintō-ryū style, founded by Tsukahara Bokuden (b. 1489, d. 1571). The main source of the duel is the Hyoho senshi denki ("Anecdotes about the Deceased Master"). Summarized, its account goes as follows:

In 1596, Musashi was 13, and Arima Kihei, who was traveling to hone his art, posted a public challenge in Hirafuku-mura. Musashi wrote his name on the challenge. A messenger came to Dorin's temple, where Musashi was staying, to inform Musashi that his duel had been accepted by Kihei. Dorin, Musashi's uncle, was shocked by this, and tried to beg off the duel in Musashi's name, based on his nephew's age. Kihei was adamant that the only way his honor could be cleared was if Musashi apologized to him when the duel was scheduled. So when the time set for the duel arrived, Dorin began apologizing for Musashi, who merely charged at Kihei with a six-foot quarterstaff, shouting a challenge to Kihei. Kihei attacked with a wakizashi, but Musashi threw Kihei on the floor, and while Kihei tried to get up, Musashi struck Arima between the eyes and then beat him to death. Arima was said to have been arrogant, overly eager to fight, and not a terribly talented swordsman.
—William Scott Wilson, The Lone Samurai[10]

The duel is odd for a number of reasons, not least of which is why Musashi was permitted to duel Arima, whether the apology was a ruse, and why Arima was there in the first place.

Travels and duels

In 1599, three years later, Musashi left his village, apparently at the age of 15 (according to the Tosakushi, "The Registry of the Sakushu Region", although the Tanji Hokin Hikki says he was 16 years old in 1599, which agrees time-wise with the age reported in Musashi's first duel).[8] His family possessions such as furniture, weapons, genealogy, and other records were left with his sister and her husband, Hirao Yoemon.

He spent his time traveling and engaging in duels, such as with an adept called Akiyama from the Tajima Province.

In 1600, a war began between the Toyotomi and Tokugawa clans. Musashi apparently fought on the side of the Toyotomi's "Army of the West", as the Shinmen clan (to whom his family owed allegiance) had allied with them. Specifically, he participated in the attempt to take Fushimi castle by assault in July 1600, in the defense of the besieged Gifu Castle in August of the same year, and finally in the famed Battle of Sekigahara. Some doubt has been cast on this final battle, as the Hyoho senshi denki has Musashi saying he is "no lord's vassal" and refusing to fight with his father (in Lord Ukita's battalion) in the battle. Omitting the Battle of Sekigahara from the list of Musashi's battles would seem to contradict the Go Rin No Sho's statement that Musashi fought in six battles, however. Regardless, as the Toyotomi side lost, it has been suggested that Musashi fled as well and spent some time training on Mount Hiko.


Ichijoji Sagarimatsu, Location of the battle between Musashi and the Yoshioka schoolAfter the battle, Musashi disappears from the records for a while. The next mention of him has him arriving in Kyoto at the age of 20 (or 21), where he famously began a series of duels against the Yoshioka School. Musashi's father, Munisai, also fought against a master of the Yoshioka school and won 2 out of 3 bouts in front of the shogun at the time, Ashikaga Yoshiaki who granted him the title of "Best in Japan". The Yoshioka School (descended from either the Tenshin Shōden Katori Shintō-ryū or the Kyo-hachi-ryū) was the foremost of the eight major schools of martial arts in Kyoto, the "Kyo-ryū" / "Schools of Kyoto". Legend has it that these eight schools were founded by eight monks taught by a legendary martial artist resident on the sacred Mount Kurama. At some point, the Yoshioka family also began to make a name for itself not merely in the art of the sword but also in the textile business and for a dye unique to them. They gave up teaching swordsmanship in 1614 when they fought in the Army of the West against Tokugawa Ieyasu in the Battle of Osaka, which they lost. But in 1604, when Musashi began duelling them, they were still preeminent. There are various accounts of the duels� — the Yoshioka family documents claim that there was only one, against Yoshioka Kenpō, which Musashi lost.

Musashi challenged Yoshioka Seijūrō, master of the Yoshioka School, to a duel. Seijūrō accepted, and they agreed to a duel outside Rendaiji in Rakuhoku, in the northern part of Kyoto on 8 March 1604. Musashi arrived late, greatly irritating Seijūrō. They faced off, and Musashi struck a single blow, per their agreement. This blow struck Seijūrō on the left shoulder, knocking him out, and crippling his left arm. He apparently passed on the headship of the school to his equally accomplished brother, Yoshioka Denshichirō, who promptly challenged Musashi for revenge. The duel variously took place in Kyoto outside a temple, Sanjūsangen-dō. Denshichirō wielded a staff reinforced with steel rings (or possibly with a ball-and-chain attached), while Musashi arrived late a second time. Musashi disarmed Denshichirō and defeated him. This second victory outraged the Yoshioka clan, whose head was now the 12-year old Yoshioka Matashichiro. They assembled a force of archers, musketeers and swordsmen, and challenged Musashi to a duel outside Kyoto, near Ichijoji Temple. Musashi broke his previous habit of arriving late, and came to the temple hours early. Hidden, Musashi assaulted the force, killing Matashichiro, and escaping while being attacked by dozens of his victim's supporters. With the death of Matashichiro, this branch of the Yoshioka School was destroyed.

After Musashi left Kyoto, some sources recount that he travelled to Hōzōin in Nara, to duel with and learn from the monks there, widely known as experts with lance weapons. There he settled down at Enkoji Temple in Banshu, where he taught the head monk's (one Tada Hanzaburo's) brother. Hanzaburo's grandson would found the Ensu-ryū based on the Enmei-ryū teachings and iaijutsu.

From 1605 to 1612, he travelled extensively all over Japan in Musha Shugyo, a warrior pilgrimage during which he honed his skills with duels. He was said to have used bokken or bokuto in actual duels. Most of the engagements from these times did not try to take the opponent's life unless both agreed, but in most duels, it is known that Musashi did not care which weapon his foe used — such was his mastery.

A document dated 5 September 1607, purporting to be a transmission by Miyamoto Munisai of his teachings, suggests Munisai lived at least to this date. In this year, Musashi departed Nara for Edo, during which he fought (and killed) a kusarigama practitioner named Shishido Baiken. In Edo, Musashi defeated Muso Gonnosuke, who would found an influential staff-wielding school known as Shinto Muso Ryu. Records of this first duel can be found in both the Shinto Muso-ryu tradition and the Hyōhō Niten Ichi-ryū (Miyamoto Musashi's school). The Shinto Muso Ryu tradition states that, after being defeated by Musashi, Muso Gonnusuke beat Musashi in a rematch. There are no current reliable sources outside the Shinto Muso Ryu tradition to confirm that this second duel took place.

Musashi is said to have fought over 60 duels and was never defeated, although this is a conservative estimate, most likely not accounting for deaths by his hand in major battles. In 1611, Musashi began practicing zazen at the Myoshinji Temple, where he met Nagaoka Sado, vassal to Hosokawa Tadaoki; Tadaoki was a powerful lord who had received the Kumamoto Domain in west-central Kyūshū after the Battle of Sekigahara. Munisai had moved to northern Kyūshū and became Tadaoki's teacher, leading to the possibility that Munisai introduced the two. Nagaoka proposed a duel with a certain adept named Sasaki Kojirō. Tokitsu believes that the duel was politically motivated, a matter of consolidating Tadaoki's control over his fief.

Duel with Sasaki Kojirō

Main article: Sasaki Kojirō
In April 13, 1612, Musashi (about age 30) fought his most famous duel, with Sasaki Kojirō, who was known as "The Demon of the Western Provinces" and who wielded a nodachi. Musashi came late and unkempt to the appointed place — the remote island of Funajima, north of Kokura. The duel was short. Musashi killed his opponent with a bokken that he had carved from an oar while traveling to the island. Musashi fashioned it to be longer than the nodachi, making it closer to a modern suburito.

Musashi's late arrival is controversial. Sasaki's outraged supporters thought it was dishonorable and disrespectful while Musashi's supporters thought it was a fair way to unnerve his opponent. Another theory is that Musashi timed the hour of his arrival to match the turning of the tide. The tide carried him to the island. After his victory, Musashi immediately jumped back in his boat and his flight from Sasaki's vengeful allies was helped by the turning of the tide. Another theory states he waited for the sun to get in the right position. After he dodged a blow Sasaki was blinded by the sun. He briefly established a fencing school that same year.

Service

In 1614–1615, Musashi participated in the war between the Toyotomi and the Tokugawa. The war had broken out because Tokugawa Ieyasu saw the Toyotomi family as a threat to his rule of Japan; most scholars believe that, as in the previous war, Musashi fought on the Toyotomi side. Osaka Castle was the central place of battle. The first battle (the Winter Battle of Osaka; Musashi's fourth battle) ended in a truce. The second (the Summer Battle of Osaka; Musashi's fifth battle) resulted in the total defeat of Toyotomi Hideyori's Army of the West by Ieyasu's Army of the East in May 1615. Some reports go so far as to say that Musashi entered a duel with Ieyasu, but was recruited after Ieyasu sensed his defeat was at hand. This may seem unlikely since Ieyasu was in his 70s and was in poor health already, but it remains unknown how Musashi came into Ieyasu's good graces.

Other accounts claim he actually served on the Tokugawa side, but such a claim is unproven, although Musashi had a close relationship with some Tokugawa vassals through his duel with Sasaki Kojirō, and in the succeeding years, he did not drop out of sight as might be expected if he were being persecuted for being on the losing side. In his later years, Ogasawara and Hosokawa supported Musashi greatly — an atypical course of action for these Tokugawa loyalists, if Musashi had indeed fought on behalf of the Toyotomi.

In 1615 he entered the service of Ogasawara Tadanao (小笠原忠直) of Harima Province, at Ogasawara's invitation, as a "Construction Supervisor," after previously gaining skills in craft. He helped construct Akashi Castle and in 1621 to lay out the organization of the town of Himeji. He also taught martial arts during his stay, specializing in instruction in the art of shuriken-throwing. During this period of service, he adopted a son.

In 1621, Musashi defeated Miyake Gunbei and three other adepts of the Togun-ryu in front of the lord of Himeji; it was after this victory that he helped plan Himeji. Around this time, Musashi developed a number of disciples for his Enmei-ryū although he had developed the school considerably earlier; at the age of 22, Musashi had already written a scroll of Enmei-ryū teachings called "Writings on the Sword Technique of the Enmei-ryū" (Enmei-ryū kenpo sho). 円/"En" meant "circle" or "perfection"; 明/"mei" meant "light"/"clarity", and 流/"ryū" meant "school"; the name seems to have been derived from the idea of holding the two swords up in the light so as to form a circle. The school's central idea is given as training to use the twin swords of the samurai as effectively as a pair of sword and jutte.

In 1622, Musashi's adoptive son, Miyamoto Mikinosuke, became a vassal to the Himeji Domain. Possibly this prompted Musashi to leave, embarking on a new series of travels, winding up in Edo in 1623, where he became friends with the Confucian scholar Hayashi Razan, who was one of the Shogun's advisors. Musashi applied to become a swordmaster to the Shogun, but as he already had two swordmasters (Ono Jiroemon Tadaaki and Yagyū Munenori — the latter also a political advisor, in addition to his position as the head of the Shogunate's secret police), Musashi's application was denied. He left Edo in the direction of Ōshū, ending up in Yamagata, where he adopted a second son, Miyamoto Iori. The two then traveled, eventually stopping in Osaka.

In 1626, Miyamoto Mikinosuke, following the custom of junshi, committed seppuku because of the death of his lord. In this year, Miyamoto Iori entered Lord Ogasawara's service. Musashi's attempt to become a vassal to the lord of Owari, like other such attempts, failed.

In 1627, Musashi began to travel again. In 1634 he settled in Kokura with Iori, and later entered the service of the daimyo Ogasawara Tadazane, taking a major role in the Shimabara Rebellion. Iori served with distinction in putting down the rebellion and gradually rose to the rank of karō — a position equal to a minister. Musashi, however was reputedly injured by a thrown rock while scouting in the front line, and was thus unnoticed.

Later life and death

Miyamoto Musashi, Self-portrait, Samurai, writer and artist, c. 1640Six years later, in 1633, Musashi began staying with Hosokawa Tadatoshi, daimyo of Kumamoto Castle, who had moved to the Kumamoto fief and Kokura, to train and paint. Ironically, it was at this time that the Hosokawa lords were also the patrons of Musashi's chief rival, Sasaki Kojirō.[clarification needed] While there he engaged in very few duels; one would occur in 1634 at the arrangement of Lord Ogasawara, in which Musashi defeated a lance specialist by the name of Takada Matabei. Musashi would officially become the retainer of the Hosokowa lords of Kumamoto in 1640. The Niten Ki records "[he] received from Lord Tadatoshi: 17 retainers, a stipend of 300 koku, the rank of ōumigashir 大組頭, and Chiba Castle in Kumamoto as his residence."[11]

In the second month of 1641, Musashi wrote a work called the Hyoho Sanju Go ("Thirty-five Instructions on Strategy") for Hosokawa Tadatoshi; this work overlapped and formed the basis for the later Go Rin No Sho. This was the year that his third son, Hirao Yoemon, became Master of Arms for the Owari fief. In 1642, Musashi suffered attacks of neuralgia, foreshadowing his future ill-health. In 1643 he retired to a cave named Reigandō as a hermit to write The Book of Five Rings. He finished it in the second month of 1645. On the twelfth of the fifth month, sensing his impending death, Musashi bequeathed his worldly possessions, after giving his manuscript copy of the Go Rin No Sho to the younger brother of Terao Magonojo, his closest disciple. He died in Reigandō cave around June 13, 1645 (Shōhō 3, 30th day of the 4th month). The Hyoho senshi denki described his passing:


The grave-marker of Miyamoto Musashi, in present-day Kumamoto Prefecture (熊本県).At the moment of his death, he had himself raised up. He had his belt tightened and his wakizashi put in it. He seated himself with one knee vertically raised, holding the sword with his left hand and a cane in his right hand. He died in this posture, at the age of sixty-two. The principal vassals of Lord Hosokawa and the other officers gathered, and they painstakingly carried out the ceremony. Then they set up a tomb on Mount Iwato on the order of the lord.
It is notable that Musashi died of what is believed to be thoracic cancer, and was not killed in combat. He died peacefully after finishing the Dokkodo ("The Way of Walking Alone", or "The Way of Self-Reliance"), 21 precepts on self-discipline to guide future generations.

His body was interred in armor within the village of Yuge, near the main road near Mount Iwato, facing the direction the Hosokawas would travel to Edo; his hair was buried on Mount Iwato itself.

Nine years later, a major source about his life — a monument with a funereal eulogy to Musashi — was erected in Kokura by Miyamoto Iori; this monument was called the Kokura hibun. An account of Musashi's life, the Niten-ki 二天記, was published in Kumamoto in 1776, by Toyota Kagehide, based on the recollections of his grandfather Toyota Masataka, who was a second generation pupil of Musashi.

Teachings

A picture of Musashi engaged in fantastic combat, by Utagawa Kuniyoshi (1798–1861).Musashi created and perfected a two-sword kenjutsu technique called niten'ichi (二天一, "two heavens as one") or nitōichi (二刀一, "two swords as one") or "Ni-Ten Ichi Ryu" (A Kongen Buddhist Sutra refers to the two heavens as the two guardians of Buddha). In this technique, the swordsman uses both a large sword, and a "companion sword" at the same time, such as a katana and wakizashi.

It is said[clarification needed]the two-handed movements of temple drummers inspired him, although it seems more likely that the technique was forged by a means of natural selection through Musashi's combat experience, or from jutte techniques which were taught to him by his father — the jutte was often used in battle paired with a sword; the jutte would parry and neutralize the weapon of the enemy whilst the sword struck or the practitioner grappled with the enemy. In his time a long sword in the left hand was referred to as gyaku nito. Today Musashi's style of swordsmanship is known as Hyōhō Niten Ichi-ryū.

Musashi was also an expert in throwing weapons. He frequently threw his short sword, and Kenji Tokitsu believes that shuriken methods for the wakizashi were the Niten Ichi Ryu's secret techniques (see Hayakutake-Watkin).

Musashi spent many years studying Buddhism and swordsmanship. He was an accomplished artist, sculptor, and calligrapher. Records also show that he had architectural skills. Also, he had a rather straightforward approach to combat, with no additional frills or aesthetic considerations. This was probably due to his real-life combat experience.

In his later life, Musashi followed the more artistic side of bushidō. He made various Zen brush paintings, calligraphy, and sculpted wood and metal. Even in The Book of Five Rings he emphasizes that samurai should understand other professions as well. It should be understood that Musashi's writings were very ambiguous. Translating them into English makes them even more so. That is why we find so many copies of Gorin no Sho. One needs to read this work, Dokkodo and Hyoho Shiji ni Kajo to get a better idea of what he was about and understand his transformation from Setsuninto (the sword that takes life) to Katsujinken (the sword that gives life).

Timeline

The following timeline follows, in chronological order (of which is based on the most accurate and most widely accepted information), the life of Miyamoto Musashi as of yet.[citation needed]

Date Age Occurrence
1578 Musashi’s brother, Shirota, is born.
1584 0 Miyamoto Musashi is born.
1591 7 Musashi is taken and raised by his uncle as a Buddhist.
1596 13 Musashi duels with Arima Kihei in Hirafuku, Hyōgo Prefecture.
1599 15 Duels with a man named Akiyama in the northern part of Hyōgo Prefecture.
1600 16/17 Believed to have fought in the Battle of Sekigahara in Sekigahara, Gifu Prefecture on the losing side.
1604 21 Musashi has 3 matches with the Yoshioka clan in Kyoto. {1} Match with Yoshioka Seijuro in Yamashiro Province, outside the city at Rendai Moor (west of Mt. Funaoka, Kita-ku, Kyoto). {2} Match with Yoshioka Denshichiro outside the city. {3} Match with Yoshioka Matashichiro outside the city at the pine of Ichijoji.
1604 21 Visits Kōfuku-ji, Nara and ends up dueling with the Buddhist priest trained in the style of Hōzōin-ryū.
1605–1612 22–29 Begins to travel again.
1607 25 Munisai (Musashi's father) passes his teachings onto Musashi.
1607 25 Duels with the kusarigama expert Shishido Baiken in the western part of Mie Prefecture.
1608 26 Duels Muso Gonnosuke, master of the five-foot staff in Edo, modern-day Tokyo.
1610 28 Fights Hayashi Osedo and Tsujikaze Tenma in Edo.
1611 29 Begins practicing zazen meditation.
1612 30 Musashi's most famous match with Sasaki Kojirō takes place on Ganryujima (Ganryu or Funa Island) off the coast of present-day Shimonoseki.
Opens a fencing school for a brief time.
1614–1615 32–33 Joins the troops of Tokugawa Ieyasu in the Winter and Summer campaigns at Osaka Castle.
1615–1621 31–37 Musashi comes into the service of Ogasawara Tadanao in Harima province as a construction supervisor.
1621 39 Duels Miyake Gunbei in Tatsuno, Hyōgo Prefecture.
1622 38 Sets up temporary residence at the castle town of Himeji in Hyōgo Prefecture.
1623 39 Travels to Edo.
Adopts a second son named Iori.
1626 42 Adopted son Mikinosuke commits seppuku following in the tradition of Junshi.
1627 43 Travels again.
1628 46 Meets with Yagyū Hyōgonosuke in Nagoya, Owari Province.
1630 46 Enters the service of Lord Hosokawa Tadatoshi.
1633 49 Begins to extensively practice the arts.
1634 50 Settles in Kokura, Fukuoka Prefecture for a short time with son Iori as a guest of Ogasawara Tadazane.
1637 53 Serves a major role in the Shimabara Rebellion.
1641 57 Writes Hyoho Sanju-go.
1642 58 Suffers severe attacks from neuralgia.
1643 59 Migrates into Reigando where he lives as a hermit.
1645 61 Finishes Go Rin No Sho / The Book of Five Rings.

Miyamoto Musashi dies from what is believed to be thoracic cancer.

Legends

After his death, various legends began to appear. Most talk about his feats in kenjutsu and other martial arts, some describing how he was able to hurl men over 5 feet backwards, other about his speed and technique. Other legends tell of how Musashi killed giant lizards in Echizen, as well as Nue in various other provinces. He gained the stature of Kensei, or "sword saint" for his mastery in swordsmanship. Some even believed he could run at super-human speed, walk on air, water and fly through the clouds.

Philosophy

Throughout Musashi's last book, The Book of Five Rings (五輪書, Go Rin no Sho?), Musashi seems to take a very philosophical approach to looking at the "Craft of War"; "There are four Ways in which men pass through life: as Gentlemen Warriors, Farmers, Artisans and Merchants." these falling into one of the few profession groups that could be observed in Musashi's time.

Throughout the book, Musashi implies that the way of the Warrior, as well as the meaning of a "True strategist" is that of somebody who has made mastery of many art forms away from that of the sword, such as tea drinking (sado), laboring, writing, and painting as Musashi practiced throughout his life. Musashi was hailed as an extraordinary sumi-e artist in the use of ink monochrome as depicted in two such famous paintings: "Shrike Perched in a Dead Tree" (Koboku Meigekizu, 枯木鳴鵙図) and "Wild Geese Among Reeds" (Rozanzu, 魯山図). Going back to the Book of Five Rings, Musashi talks deeply about the ways of Buddhism.

He makes particular note of Artisans and Foremen. In the time in which he writes the book, the majority of houses in Japan were made of wood. In the use of building a house, foremen have to employ strategy based upon the skill and ability of their workers.

In comparison to warriors and soldiers, Musashi notes the ways in which the artisans thrive through events; the ruin of houses, the splendor of houses, the style of the house, the tradition and name or origins of a house. These too, are similar to the events which are seen to have warriors and soldiers thrive; the rise and fall of prefectures, countries and other such events are what make uses for Warriors, as well as the literal comparisons of the: "The carpenter uses a master plan of the building, and the Way of strategy is similar in that there is a plan of campaign".

Way of strategy

Throughout the book, Go Rin No Sho, the idea which Musashi pushes is that the "way of the strategist" (Heihō 兵法) is similar to how a carpenter and his tools are mutually inclusive, e.g. — A carpenter can do nothing without his tools, and vice versa. This too, he compares to skill, and tactical ability in the field of battle.

Initially, Musashi notes that throughout China and Japan, there are many "sword fencers" who walk around claiming they are Strategists, but are, in fact, not — this may be due to the fact that Musashi had defeated some such Strategists, such as Arima Kihei.

The idea is that by reading his writings, one can become a true strategist from ability and tactical skill that Musashi had learned in his lifetime. He pushes that Strategy and Virtue are something which can be earned by knowing the ways of life, the professions that are around, to perhaps learn the skills and knowledge of people and the skills of their particular professions.

However, Musashi seems to state that the value of Strategy seems to be homogeneous. He notes that:

The attendants of the Kashima Kantori shrines of the province Hitachi received instruction from the gods, and made schools based on this teaching, travelling from province to province instructing men. This is the recent meaning of strategy.
As well as noting that Strategy is destined to die;

Of course, men who study in this way think they are training the body and spirit, but it is an obstacle to the true Way, and its bad influence remains forever. Thus the true Way of strategy is becoming decadent and dying out.

As a form, strategy was said to be one of "Ten Abilities and Seven Arts" that a Warrior should have, but Musashi disagrees that one person can gain Strategy by being confined to one particular style, which seems particularly fitting as he admits "I practice many arts and abilities — all things with no teacher" — this perhaps being one of the reasons he was so highly regarded a swordsman.

Musashi's metaphor for Strategy is that of the Bulb and the flower, similar to western philosophy of "the chicken or the egg", the "bulb" being the student, the "flower" being the technique. He also notes that most places seem to be mostly concerned with their technique and its beauty. Musashi writes, "In this kind of Way of strategy, both those teaching and those learning the way are concerned with coloring and showing off their technique, trying to hasten the bloom of the flower" (as opposed to the actual harmony between strategy and Skill.)

With those who are concerned with becoming masters of strategy, Musashi points out that as a carpenter becomes better with his tools and is able to craft things with more expert measure, so too can a warrior, or strategist become more skilled in his technique. However, just as a carpenter needs to be able to use his tools according to plans, so too must a strategist be able to adapt his style or technique to the required strategy of the battle he is currently engaged in.

This description also draws parallels between the weapons of a trooper (or soldier) and the tools of a carpenter; the idea of "the right tool for the right job" seems to be implied a lot throughout the book, Go Rin No Sho. Musashi also puts into motion the idea that when a Carpenter is skilled enough in aspects of his job, and creates them with expert measure, then he can become a foreman.

Although it is not expressly mentioned, it may be seen that Musashi indicated that when you have learned the areas in which your craft requires, be it carpentry, farming, fine art or battle, and are able to apply them to any given situation, then you will be experienced enough to show others the wisdom of your ways, be it as a foreman of craftsmen, or as a general of an army.

From further reading into the book, the idea of "Weapons within strategy," as well as Musashi referring to the power of the Writer, may seem that the Strategy which Musashi refers to does not exclusively reside within the domain of weaponry and duels, but within the realm of war and battles with many men:

Just as one man can beat ten, so a hundred men can beat a thousand, and a thousand can beat ten thousand. In my strategy, one man is the same as ten thousand, so this strategy is the complete warrior's craft.

Ni-Ten Ichi Ryu

Within the book, Musashi mentions that the use of Two swords within strategy is mutually beneficial between those who utilise this skill. The idea of using two hands for a sword is an idea which Musashi disagrees with, in that there is not fluidity in movement when using two hands — "If you hold a sword with both hands, it is difficult to wield it freely to left and right, so my method is to carry the sword in one hand"; he as well disagrees with the idea of using a sword with two hands on a horse, and/or riding on unstable terrain, such as muddy swamps, rice fields, or within crowds of people.

In order to learn the strategy of Ni-Ten Ichi Ryu, Musashi employs that by training with two long swords, one in each hand, you will be able to overcome the cumbersome nature of using a sword in both hands. Although difficult, Musashi agrees that there are times in which the Longsword must be used with two hands, but if your skill is good enough, you should not need it. The idea of using two long swords is that you are starting with something to which you are unaccustomed, and that you will find difficult, but will adapt to after much use.

After using two long swords proficiently enough, Musashi then states that your mastery of a Longsword, and a "Companion Sword", most likely a wakizashi, will be much increased — "When you become used to wielding the long sword, you will gain the power of the Way and wield the sword well.".

In short, it could be seen that from the excerpts from Go Rin No Sho, the real strategy behind Ni-Ten No Ichi Ryu, is that there is no real iron-clad method, path, or type of weaponry that is specific to the style of Ni-Ten No Ichi Ryu:

You can win with a long weapon, and yet you can also win with a short weapon. In short, the Way of the Ichi school is the spirit of winning, whatever the weapon and whatever its size.

Long sword

The strategy of the long sword is different than other strategies, in that it is much more straightforward. In the strategy of the longsword, it seems that Musashi's ideal was, that by mastering gripping the sword with two fingers, it could become a platform used for moving onto the mastery of Ni-Ten Ichi Ryu, as well as being able to use two broadswords, or more masterfully use a companion sword.

However, just because the grip is to be light, it does not mean that the attack or slash from the sword will be weak. Like with any other technique in the Ni-Ten Ichi Ryu, he notes:

If you try to wield the long knife quickly, you will mistake the Way. To wield the long sword well, you must wield it calmly. If you try to wield it quickly, like a folding fan or a short sword, you will err by using "short sword chopping". You cannot cut a man down with a long sword using this method.

Like with most disciplines in martial arts, Musashi notes that the movement of the sword after the cut is made must not be superfluous; instead of quickly returning to a stance or position, one should allow the sword to come to the end of its path from the force used. In this manner, the technique will become freely flowing, as opposed to abrupt.

Musashi also discouraged the use of only one sword for fighting, and the use of over-large swords like nodachi due to the fact that they were cumbersome and unwieldy.

Religion

Even from a late age, Musashi separated his religion from his involvement in swordsmanship. Excerpts such as the one below, from The Book of Five Rings, demonstrate a philosophy that is thought to have stayed with him throughout his lives:

There are many ways: Confucianism, Buddhism, the ways of elegance, rice-planting, or dance; these things are not to be found in the Way of the Warrior.
—[12]

However, the belief that Musashi disliked Shinto is inaccurate, as he criticises the Shintō-ryū style of swordsmanship, and not Shinto, the religion. In Musashi's Dokkodo, his stance on religion is further elucidated: "Respect Buddha and the gods without counting on their help.".[13]

Musashi as an artist

Kingfisher Perched on a Withered Branch, by MusashiIn his later years, Musashi claimed in his Go Rin No Sho that "When I apply the principle of strategy to the ways of different arts and crafts, I no longer have need for a teacher in any domain." He proved this by creating recognized masterpieces of calligraphy and classic ink painting. His paintings are characterized by skilled use of ink washes and an economy of brush stroke. He especially mastered the "broken ink" school of landscapes, applying it to other subjects, such as his Kobokumeikakuzu ("Kingfisher Perched on a Withered Branch"; part of a triptych whose other two members were "Hotei Walking" and "Sparrow on Bamboo"), his Hotei Watching a Cockfight, and his Rozanzu ("Wild Geese Among Reeds").

Seijitsu Judo Ryu Oath

  • "Without permission of the Authorities of Seijitsu Judo Dojo, I will not teach or divulge the Knowledge of the Art I shall be taught.

    I will not perform the Art in public for personal gain.

    I will lay no blame on anyone, except myself, in the event of accident, even if it should result in my death.

    I will conduct myself in such a way as never to discredit the traditions and honor of Seijitsu Judo Dojo.

    I will not abuse, or misuse, the Knowlege of Judo.

    I shall push and persevere."


Copied from the original Kodokan Oath and adapted by Seijitsu Judo Dojo; Judo - The Basic Technical Principles and Exercises by G. Koizumi (7th Dan), Founder of the Judo Movement in Great Britain and Europe, July 1958

About Judo


The Purpose of Judo Discipline

According to Jigoro Kano, the founder of Kodokan Judo:

  • "Judo is the way to the most effective use of both physical and spiritual strength. By training you in attacks and defenses it refines your body and soul and helps you make the spiritual essence of Judo a part of your very being. In this way you are able to perfect yourself and contribute something of value to the world. This is the final goal of Judo Discipline."

Anyone who intends to follow the way of Judo must above all instill this teaching in his heart.

Judo in Action; Kazuzo Kudo, 9th Dan; Japan Publications Trading Company, Tokyo, Japan; January 1967

On Judo and the Changing Times

  • "As thoughts on any subject advance, there is the danger that people will tend to regard past ideas as no more than empty academic theory. Such an over-prejudiced attitude must not be condoned."

Tetsuya Sato and Isao Okano, Vital Judo, Japan Publications Inc., 1973


On the Value of Continuous Scholarly Study in Judo

  • "We live today and die tomorrow but the books we read tell us things of a thousand years."

Yamaga Sokō (September 21, 1622 - October 23, 1685) was a Japanese philosopher and strategist during the Tokugawa shogunate. He was a Confucian, and applied Confucius's idea of the "superior man" to the Samurai class of Japan. This became an important part of the Samurai way of life and code of conduct known as Bushido
.

On Judo and its Lifelong Pursuit